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Keith B. Han• 
Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines is there an Actionable 
Subsurface Trespass? 
ABSTRACT 
The law recognizes trespass liability for subsurface intrusions, at least in some 
circumstances. Further, courts sometimes have stated that ownership of land 
extends to the earth's center. But such statements are dicta. Few courts have 
carefully considered the maximum extent of subsurface ownership or subsurface 
trespass liability. Courts in two jurisdictions have recently addressed whether a 
person incurs liability when he causes hydraulic fracturing fluid to intrude into the 
subsurface of a neighbor's land, but the courts reached opposite conclusions, with 
each suggesting that public policy supported its position. Neither adequately 
examined the legal issues. Careful consideration of trespass concepts 
demonstrates that a person should not incur liability for such intrusions unless he 
designed the fractures to extend beneath the neighbor's land or the fractures 
extended further beneath the neighbor's subsurface than the maximum typical 
discrepancy between planned and actual fracture lengths. Further, this result 
serves the public policy concerns addressed by each court that recently addressed 
this issue. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of hydraulic fracturing 1 raises numerous legal issues. 2 One of the most 
interesting issues relates to property rights and is illustrated by the following scenario. Suppose 
• Keith B. Hall is Director of the Mineral Law Institute and the Campanile Charities Professor of 
Energy Law at Louisiana State University (LSU), where he teaches Mineral Rights, Advanced 
Mineral Law, International Petroleum Transactions, and a seminar that focuses on environmental 
issues relating to oil and gas activity. Before joining LSU, he was a member of Stone Pigman 
Walther Wittmann LLC in New Orleans, where he represented clients in oil and gas, 
environmental, and toxic tort matters. He serves on the Board of Editors for the Oil and Gas 
Reporter and as Chair of the Louisiana State Bar Association's  Environmental Law Section. 
Before going to law school, he worked as a chemical engineer. 
1Hydraulic fracturing is sometimes called by various other terms, such as "fracing," "fracking," 
"hydrofracturing," and "hydrofracking." Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation 
Applied, 22 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 361 ,  361 (2012). "Fracking" has become the 
shortened term most often used in the media, but "fracing" is more traditional and still is often 
used by persons who regularly do oil and gas law or other work in the industry. Norman J. Hyne, 
NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION, DRILLING 
l 
that a company's hydraulic fracturing operations cause fracturing fluid to travel from the 
subsurface of one property into the subsurface of a neighboring property where the company has 
no authority to operate. The neighbor complains that the cross-boundary fracturing has harmed 
him because it is facilitating the drainage of oil or gas from the subsurface of his property, over 
to the company's well, but otherwise the neighbor does not allege any actual damages. In those 
circumstances, does the intrusion of fracturing fluid into the subsurface of the neighbor's 
property constitute an actionable subsurface trespass?3 
AND PRODUCTION at 423-6 (2d ed. 2001 )  (petroleum geologist using "fracing"); Christopher 
S. Kulander, Environmental Effects of Petroleum Production: 2010-2011 Texas Legislative 
Developments, 44 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 863, 86-77 (20 12) (oil and gas law professor repeatedly 
using "fracing"); Bruce M. Kramer and Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture: An Oil and 
Gas Perspective, 35 Envtl. L. 899, 933-6 (2005) (two oil and gas law professors repeatedly using 
"fracing"). Because of Natural Resources Journal style guidelines, "fracking" and "hydraulic 
fracturing" are used in this article, rather than "fracing." 
2 Several of the issues relate to environmental concerns. A discussion of the various issues raised 
by hydraulic fracturing is beyond the scope of this article, but there are other articles that provide 
a broader review of the range of issues raised by fracturing. See, e.g., Keith B.  Hall, Recent 
Developments in Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation and Litigation, J. Land Use & Env. Law 
(forthcoming); Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 2 1  Vill. 
Envtl. L.J. 229 (2010); Christopher S. Kulander, Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Issues and 
Trends, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1 10 1  (2013); Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and 
Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 837 
(201 2). 
There are also articles that focus on specific issues raised by hydraulic fracturing. Robin Kundis 
Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing ( Fracking), Federalism, And The Water-Energy Nexus, 49 Idaho L. 
Rev. 24 1 (2013); Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory 
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 Idaho L. Rev. 399 (2013); Keith B. Hall, 
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under The Safe Drinking Water Act 19 Buff. Envtl. L.J. l 
(20 1 1 -2012); Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing 
Energy Revolution, 1 1 1  Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar (201 1 ). 
3 Others have also addressed this issue. See, e. g. , David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil 
Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19  Penn St. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 241 ,  259-64 (20 1 1 ); Owen L. Anderson, Lord Coke, the Restatement, and Modern 
Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 203 (2010-201 1 ); Laura H. Burney and 
Norman J.  Hyne, Hydraulic Fracturing: Stimulating Your Well or Trespassing?, 44 Rocky Mtn. 
Min. L. Inst. Ch. 19  ( 1998);Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: the Stealthy Subsurface 
Trespass, 28 Tulsa L.J. 3 1 1  ( 1993). 
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Two courts have faced this issue in recent years-the Texas Supreme Court4 and the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia5-but neither court spent 
much time analyzing whether a trespass had occurred. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that 
it did not need to decide whether there had been a trespass because the rule of capture barred the 
recovery sought by the plaintiffs. But the rule of capture would not necessarily bar recovery if 
there had been trespass. In the West Virginia case, the defendant argued that, as a matter of law, 
a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid in a deep formation would not constitute a trespass. The 
court dismissed that argument in a conclusory manner, relying on questionable dicta regarding 
the extent of a landowner's subsurface ownership and failing to analyze that dicta. Thus, the 
courts reached opposite results, but each court's analysis was deficient. 
This article analyzes the trespass issue that received short shrift by both the Texas 
Supreme Court and the federal district court. Ultimately, this article concludes that subsurface 
intrusions of fracturing fluid should not be classified as an actionable trespass, provided such 
intrusions are "near border" intrusions and that drainage of hydrocarbons is the only alleged 
harm. Further, a contrary result that classified such near-border intrusions as an actionable 
trespass would promote waste and impair correlative rights. On the other hand, a traditional 
trespass analysis demonstrates that an actionable subsurface trespass would occur if cross-border 
fractures go beyond the near-border area. Finally, this article concludes that an argument can be 
made for a "modern" trespass rule in which such subsurface intrusion would not constitute a 
trespass no matter how far the fractures went, such a rule could result in waste and harm to 
correlative rights unless a conservation agency closely regulates the extent of fracturing and the 
use of statutory pooling. 
4 Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
5 Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 20 13  WL 2097397 (N.D.W.Va. 20 1 3). 
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Part I of this article explains the nature of hydraulic fracturing. Part II discusses the rule 
of capture, the doctrine that the Texas Supreme Court concluded would generally bar claims for 
subsurface intrusions by fracturing fluids. Part Ill examines how the law of trespass has been 
applied in trespass cases based on subsurface intrusions, as well as in trespass cases based on 
airspace intrusions, which raise some of the same issues as subsurface intrusions. Part IV reviews 
past hydraulic fracturing litigation. Part V analyzes how a traditional trespass analysis applies to 
subsurface intrusions. Parts VI and VII demonstrate why the viability of a trespass claim based 
on subsurface intrusions by fracturing fluid should depend on whether the intrusion is limited to 
"near border" areas. Finally, Part VIII analyzes proposals for a "modem" subsurface trespass 
model that would eliminate virtually all claims for trespass based on subsurface intrusions of 
fracturing fluid. 
I. BASICS OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
When natural deposits of oil or gas are found, the deposits typically are found in the pore 
spaces of sedimentary rock formations.6 In contrast to coal and "hard" minerals that generally are 
found in the solid state, oil and gas most often exist as fluids-either as a liquid or a gas.7 In 
some ways, this makes oil or gas easier to handle than solid minerals. Whereas solid minerals 
must be "picked up" and moved, oil or gas will flow of their own accord from a location at 
higher pressure to a location at lower pressure.8 Further, underground formations are often under 
a much higher pressure than exists on the surface. Thus, if a well is drilled to a formation that 
6 Richard C. Selley, ELEMENTS OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 239 (2d ed. 1998); James G. 
Speight, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 103 (2d ed. 199 1). 
7 Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 
101 .  But oil can exist as a solid or as a liquid that is so viscous that it appears to be in the solid 
state. Id. 
8 Id.§ 104; Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1 192, 1 197 
(W.D.Ark. 1998); Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Com'n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 
493, 497, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 1267 ( 1 989). 
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contains oil or gas, the natural pressure of the formation often will cause those fluids to flow to 
the well and up to the surface. 9 
To get to the well, the oil or gas must move through the rock formation. Often, the oil or 
gas can do this by moving from one pore space to the next, through interconnections between the 
pores. 10 Or, in some rock formations, natural fractures (cracks) exist and the oil or gas can move 
through the fractures to the wellbore. 1 1  But in other rock formations, the interconnections 
between pores are not sufficient to allow a significant rate of fluid flow and there are few natural 
fractures. 12 If such formations contain oil or gas, it will not be economical to produce those 
substances through drilling alone. Instead, the operator of a well must generate fractures in the 
formation in order to create a pathway for oil or gas to move to the well. 1 3  
Operators began engaging in fracturing in the 1 860s. 14 They would lower an explosive 
into the well and detonate it, thereby fracturing the formation. 15 Such "explosive fracturing," 
sometimes called "shooting a well," was used until at least the mid-l 900s. 1 6  But in the late 
9 Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 
104. Further, oil can be pumped to the surface. Id. 
1 0  Martin S .  Raymond & William L. Leffler, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN 
NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 39 (2006). 
1 1 Christopher Kulander, The States' Legal Framework: Texas/Louisiana Region American Law 
And Jurisprudence On Fracing, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Special Inst. On 
Hydraulic Fracturing Core Issues & Trends, Paper 3A (201 1) (discussing the Austin Chalk as an 
example of a low permeability formation that has extensive natural fracturing) (available from 
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation or on Westlaw). 
12 See Daniel Yergin, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE 
MODERN WORLD 326 (20 1 1 ). 
1 3  Id. 
14 See HYNE, supra note __ , at 422; see also Roberts v. Dickey, 20 F. Cas. 880, 883-84 (W.D. 
Pa. 1 87 1 )  (No. 1 1 ,899) (discussing a patent granted in 1866 for an invention relating to explosive 
fracturing); see also People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 3 1  N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892) (nuisance action in which 
�laintiffs complained about use of explosive fracturing in urban area). 
5 HYNE, supra note __ , at 422; see also Gregory Zuckerman, THE FRACKERS, 27-8 (2013). 
16 HYNE, supra note_, at 422. 
5 
1940s, hydraulic fracturing was developed.17 In hydraulic fracturing, companies use hydraulic 
pressure to open new fractures and increase the size of existing fractures, thereby opening 
pathways for oil or gas to flow to the well.18 Today, hydraulic fracturing is a process that is 
frequently used by companies engaged in the exploration for and production of oil and natural 
gas.19 
II. THE RULE OF CAPTURE 
In the United States, the right to explore for and produce minerals generally belongs to 
the owner of the land beneath which the minerals are found. 20 Because solid minerals remain 
17 Thomas E. Kurth et at, American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracking, 47 Rocky Mountain 
Min. L. Found. J. 277 (2010). 
18 Hyne, supra n. _at 423. 
19 A Congresssoinal Research Service report states that more than 90 percent of new wells in the 
United States are hydraulically fractured. Mary Tiemann and Adam Vann, Hydraulic Fracturing 
and Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Issues, Congressional Research Service (Jan. 10, 2013). 
20 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tomlinson, 859 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Oki. 1993); California Minerals v. 
County of Kem, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 ,  6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); La. Rev. Stat. 3 1  :6. An exception to 
the general rule is that, in most states, ownership of mineral rights can be severed from the 
ownership of land. This can occur if a landowner sells the mineral rights or if the landowner sells 
surface rights and retains mineral rights for himself. Doing either of these things creates separate 
estates-a mineral estate and a surface estate. Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 301; Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 
906 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (N.D. W.Va. 2012). 
This article will refer to the person who has the rights to explore for and produce minerals from a 
certain area of land as being the "landowner." But in most states a person who owns land can sell 
his mineral rights, or sell his land and reserve the mineral rights for himself, thereby creating a 
"split estate" in which one person owns the "surface estate" and another person owns the 
"mineral estate." Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND 
GAS LAW § 202.2. Thus, the person who owns the right to explore for and produce minerals 
from particular land could be the owner of a mineral estate, rather than the landowner. Louisiana 
law does not allow the creation of a mineral estate, but it allows the creation of a mineral 
servitude, which has many of the same characteristics of a mineral estate. Keith Hall, Louisiana 
Oil and Gas Update, 19 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 361 ,  366-7 (201 3). But the creation of a mineral 
estate generally establishes a permanent cleavage of surface and mineral rights, whereas a 
mineral servitude will terminate in the event that there is ever a ten-year period during which the 
servitude rights are not used. La. Rev. Stat. 3 1 :27. 
6 
stationary until they are removed from the subsurface by human action, it generally should be 
fairly simple to determine who has a right to produce the solid minerals in a particular location-
indeed, it should be as simple as determining who the landowner is. But different issues arise 
with respect to minerals such as oil and gas,21 which generally exist in a fluid state, and which 
are sometimes called "fugacious" minerals.22 
A. The Rule of Capture and its Justifications 
When a well is drilled to a subsurface formation that contains oil or natural gas, those 
fluids generally will flow to the well from the surrounding area. If the area drained by the well 
extends beyond the borders of the tract of land on which the well is located, the well will 
produce some oil or gas that is drained from beneath neighboring land. This can lead to disputes. 
For example, suppose that Black, the owner of Blackacre, drills a well near the border 
with Whiteacre, a tract owned by his neighbor, White. Black's well begins producing oil at a 
substantial rate, with much of the oil likely being drained from beneath Whiteacre. Is Black 
entitled to operate the well and keep all the proceeds, or is White entitled to some type of 
relief- perhaps an injunction to prohibit Black from operating the well or a judgment requiring 
Black to share the proceeds with White? 
The general rule in the United States that landowners own the mineral rights relating to their land 
is not the global norm. In most other countries, the national government owns the right to 
produce minerals. John S. Lowe, OIL AND GAS IN A NUTSHELL 8 (5th edition 2009). 
21 Test Drilling Service Co. v. Hanor Co., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971-2 (C.D. Ill. 2004) (noting that different 
issues and rules apply to solid minerals as opposed to minerals that appear in fluid form); compare La. Rev. Stat. 
31 :5 (landowner can own solid minerals in place beneath his property) with La. Rev. Stat. 31 :6 (landowner does not 
own minerals that are beneath his land in fluid form, and instead merely has the exclusive right to conduct 
operations to recover such fluids and reduce them to possession); Callahan v. Martin. 3 43 P.2d 788. 791-2 (Cal. 
1935) (noting that solid mineral rights created an interest in reality, with an absolute title to the mineral rights, unlike 
oil and gas mineral rights, which are in the nature of a profit a prendre-an interest in land similar to an easement); 
Tennessee Valley Kaolin Corp. v. Perry, 526 S.W.2d 488, 491 n. I (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (Tennessee law views 
leases for solid minerals differently than leases for oil and gas). 
22 See La. Rev. Stat. 31:5 cmt. (referring to "fugacious" minerals). 
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Courts began facing this issue in the late 1800s. One of the leading early cases is Kelly v. 
Ohio Oil Co.23 In Kelly, the plaintiff held a mineral lease that covered 165 acres in Findlay 
County, Ohio. 24 The defendant held drilling rights for tracts of land on the east and west borders 
of the plaintiffs leasehold,25 and the defendant owned land on the south border of plaintiffs 
leasehold. 26 Beneath the land was a sandstone formation that contained oil. 27 
The plaintiff brought suit, complaining that the defendant was drilling wells near the east, 
south, and west property lines. The plaintiff alleged that a well drilled to the sandstone would 
drain an area with a radius of about 250 feet around the well, and that the defendant had begun 
drilling a series of wells only 25 feet from the border of Hastings' land, so that the defendant's 
wells would drain a significant amount of oil from beneath Hasting's property. The plaintiff 
sought a permanent injunction to bar the defendant from operating wells any closer than 250 feet 
from Hastings' land. The lower court dismissed the plaintiffs claim, concluding that he failed to 
state a cause of action. 
The plaintiff appealed, but the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of his claim. 
The court emphasized property rights as a basis of its decision. The court stated that "[t]he right 
to drill and produce oil on one's own land is absolute, and cannot be supervised or controlled by 
a court or an adjoining landowner."28 The court found it "intolerable that the owner of real 
property, before making improvements on his own lands, should be compelled to submit to what 
his neighbor or a court of equity might regard as a reasonable use of his property." The court also 
noted that it is impossible to know what fraction of the produced oil came from beneath each 
23 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897). 
24 Id. at 399. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
21 Id. 
28 Id. at 401. 
8 
tract. Therefore, "whatever gets into the well belongs to the owner of the well, no matter where it 
came from." Finally, the court stated that "an ample and sufficient remedy" is for the neighbor to 
drill his own wells, and that he is not entitled to either an injunctive relief or an accounting. 
Another early case was Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.29 In Barnard, the 
defendant leased a tract of land. A comer of the tract protruded into the plaintiffs' tract of land. 
The defendant drilled a well near the comer and began producing natural gas. 30 The plaintiffs 
brought suit, complaining that much of the natural gas was being drained from beneath their 
property. The court concluded that the typical gas well in that area would drain a ten-acre circle 
that surrounded the well. Further, if a ten-acre circle were drawn around the defendant's well, 
slightly more than three-fourths of the area within the circle would be the plaintiffs' land. Thus, a 
plausible estimate was that 75-percent of the gas produced from the defendant's well came from 
beneath the plaintiffs' land. 
The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's case, however, basing its decision in part on the 
right of a landowner to drill a well wherever he chooses on his property.31 The court also noted 
that "[t]here is no certain way of ascertaining how much of the oil and gas that comes out of the 
well" was originally beneath the property on which a well is located and how much was beneath 
the neighboring property.32 Accordingly, explained the court, if a landowner believes that his 
property is being drained, his only remedy is to drill his own well.33 Instead of seeking to stop his 
29 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907). 
30 Id. at 801. 
Jt Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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neighbor's drilling, he should "go and do likewise."34 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's per 
curiam decision affirmed and quoted in full the lower court's decision. 35 
This result became known as the "rule of capture," or sometimes the "law of capture,"36 
and appears to have been adopted by all states that have addressed the issue in the oil and gas 
context.37 
B. Limitations on the Rule of Capture 
There are certain limitations on application of the rule of capture. Three of the most 
significant limitations, each of which also is relevant to the subject of this article, are that the rule 
of capture does not apply if: (1) a person commits a subsurface trespass by engaging in slant 
drilling that results in the well bottoming beneath his neighbor's property; (2) a person 
negligently or intentionally wastes oil or gas or he intentionally interferes with the ability of 
someone else to produce oil or gas from a formation, without benefit to himself; or (3) the rule 
has been superseded by conservation statutes and regulations. 38 
34 ld. 
3s Id. 
36 Terence Daintith, FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE SHAPTED THE 
WORLD OIL INDUSTRY (RFF Press 2010); Bruce M. Kramer and Owen L. Anderson, The 
Rule of Capture: An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 Envtl. L. 899, 933-6 (2005). 
37 See, e.g., Gadeco, LLC v. Industrial Com'n of State, 812 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D. 2012); 
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008); Bonner v. 
Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1 176, 1185 (Oki. 1993); Desornneaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 277 
So.2d 218, 220 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
Other sources provide excellent, more comprehensive treatment of the rule of capture. See, e. g., 
Bruce M. Kramer and Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture - An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 
Envtl. L. 899 (2005); Terence Daintith, Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the 
World Oil Industry (RFF Press 2010). 
38 Another limitation that is not at issue here is the rule of capture may not apply when a 
company places natural gas into subsurface storage and that gas escapes and is later produced 
from a well operated by a neighbor. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 
296 P.3d 1 106 (Kan. 2013). 
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The two latter types of limitation have been justified by the doctrine of "correlative 
rights." This doctrine recognizes that when multiple tracts of land overlie a common reservoir of 
oil or gas, the owners of those separate tracts each have a right to produce oil or gas from the 
reservoir, through operations on their own properties, but that each owner's exercise of his rights 
can affect the common reservoir and thereby affect the ability of the other owners' to produce oil 
or gas from the reservoir.39 Accordingly, each owner has certain duties that relate to the 
reservoir, and the other owners have rights that arise from that duty.40 
1 .  Surface Trespass and Subsurface Trespass by Slant Drilling 
A landowner generally has the exclusive right to explore for and produce minerals from 
operations on his own land.41 Further, the rule of capture provides that the landowner becomes 
the owner of all the oil and gas produced from operations on his own land, and that he incurs no 
liability to his neighbor, even if some of the oil or gas that is drained from beneath the neighbor's 
land.42 Thus, the rule of capture does not authorize a person to enter the surface of another 
person's land to conduct oil and gas operations. 43 If a landowner conducts operations on his 
39 Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. L.J. 1, 2 (1958); Halbouty v. 
Railroad Commission, 357 S.W.2d 364, 374 (Tex. 1962) ("It is an obvious result that if in a 
common reservoir one tract owner is allowed to produce many times more gas than underlies his 
tract he is denying to some other landowner in the reservoir a fair chance to produce the gas 
underlying his land."). 
40 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562-3 (Tex. 1948); Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., Inc. 
v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 212 (La. 1919) ("The rights of the several owners of the gas 
field are coequal; one owner cannot exercise his own right so as to preclude his neighbor from 
exercising his, or so as to interfere with the neighbor."). Professor David Pierce has argued that 
the question of whether a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluids constitutes an actionable 
trespass should be resolved using a correlative rights analysis. David E. Pierce, Minimizing the 
Impact of Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. Rev. 
759, 771 (2009). 
41 See, e. g. , La. Rev. Stat. 31:6. 
42 See, e.g. , La. Rev. Stats. 31:8, 14. 
43 Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897) (early rule of capture case stating: ''To 
drill an oil well near the line of one's land cannot interfere with the legal rights of the owner of 
11 
neighbor's property without permission, those operations generally will constitute a trespass, and 
the trespasser typically will be required to reimburse the neighbor for the value of the oil or gas 
produced.44 Depending on circumstances and the jurisdiction, the trespasser may or may not be 
able to deduct his drilling expenses from the reimbursement amount.45 
A similar result follows for a subsurface intrusion by "slant" drilling. Slant dri11ing occurs 
when the wellbore of a "vertical" well does not go straight downward. Sometimes an operator 
deliberately engages in slant drilling, which might be called "directional" drilling when it is done 
intentionally, and sometimes the operator's direction of drilling will deviate from true vertical 
inadvertently.46 Courts have recognized that the operator of a well commits a subsurface trespass 
if he begins drilling a well at a surface location where he has the right to operate, but the 
wellbore veers from true vertical to such an extent that the wellbore intrudes into the subsurface 
of a neighboring property where the operator has no right to drill.47 In such cases, the measure of 
damages may be the value of the oil or gas produced by the trespassing wellbore.48 
the adjoining lands so long as all operations are confined to the lands upon which the well is 
drilled.") 
44 See, e. g. , La. Civ. Code art. 488. When a company trespasses and drills without authority to 
operate at the surface location, the company generally does not knowingly trespass. John S. 
Lowe, et al. Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 144 (West, 6th Edition, 2013). Instead, the 
operator generally has operated pursuant to a lease obtained from a person without good title or 
has operated pursuant to an otherwise valid lease that has terminated (it is not always clear 
whether a lease has terminated because, although mineral leases generally have a primary term 
that is a stated number of years, virtually all modem leases have habendum clauses and other 
clauses that can lead to a later termination, and many have delay rental clauses or other 
rrovisions that can lead to earlier terminations). 5 See, e. g. , La. Civ. Code art. 488. 
46 Hyne, supra n. _ at 285. 
47Wiliams v. Continental Oil Co. , 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas 
Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471 (La. 1944); Alphonw 
E. Bell Corporation v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 16 P.2d 167 (Cal. App. 1938). 
48 The Manual of Oil & Gas Terms defines "subsurface trespass" as follows: 
The bottoming of a well on the land of another without his consent. Subsurface 
trespass results from the drilling of a "slant" or DIRECTIONAL WELL (q.v.), 
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2. Negligent or Intentional Waste or Deliberate Interference with the Production Rights 
of Others 
Courts have used the correlative rights doctrine to justify certain jurisprudential limits on 
the rule of capture. Two examples of such limits are found in decisions recognizing that the rule 
of capture does not protect a defendant from liability for negligent or intentional waste of oil or 
gas in a reservoir, 49 and that the rule of capture does not protect a person from liability for acts 
that are of no benefit to himself, and which are done with the intent of interfering with someone 
else's ability to exercise his rights to produce from the common pool. 
The non-application of the rule of capture in cases of negligent or intentional waste of 
resources is illustrated by Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.50 In that case, the defendants were drilling 
a gas well that blew out, caught fire, and burned for several years.51 The land around the well 
cratered, and the cratering eventually extended to the plaintiffs' property, damaging it.52 The 
plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that the blowout resulted from the defendants' negligence. 53 The 
plaintiffs sought a money judgment for the damages to their property and for the natural gas that 
had been drained from beneath their property because of the blowout.54 
[Why is this in caps? Even if that punctuation appeared in the original, we should 
use lower case unless there is a compelling reason to use caps] which may be 
intentional or unintentional. Since subsurface trespass is as wrongful as surface 
trespass, the same liability attaches, viz., damages in the amount of the value of 
the oil produced. Whether the trespasser is entitled to a credit for the cost of 
producing the oil depends on whether his trespass was made in good faith or bad 
faith, as it does in the case of surface trespass. 
Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS. 
49 La. Rev. Stat. 31:14; Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. L.J. 1, 2 
(1958). 
so 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948). 
51 Id. at 559. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 ld. 
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The defendants argued that the rule of capture prevented the plaintiffs from recovering 
the value of oil or gas drained from beneath their property by the defendants' well. The Texas 
Supreme Court held that "under the law of capture there is no liability for reasonable and 
legitimate drainage from the common pool."55 But the court also stated that drainage which 
results from the negligent waste of gas is not legitimate drainage, and that the mle of capture 
should not deny the plaintiffs a remedy for the losses they sustained because of such waste. 56 
The non-application of the rule of capture in cases in which a defendant intentionally 
interferes with another person's ability to produce oil or gas from the common reservoir is 
illustrated by Higgins Oil & Fuel Co .. Inc. v. Guaranty Oil Co.57 In that case, the plaintiff drilled 
a well and began producing oil from a reservoir from which other persons in the area were also 
producing oil. The defendant was the plaintiffs neighbor. The defendant also drilled a well to 
the reservoir. For some reason, the defendant's well was not productive. But his well seemed to 
be physically linked to the common reservoir. Indeed, the plaintiff alleged that the opening to the 
surface provided by the defendant's well was diminishing the rate of production from the 
plaintiffs well. And, though the defendant's well was not productive, the defendant refused to 
close or plug it, instead preferring to leave it open with the intent and purpose of decreasing the 
plaintiffs ability to produce oil. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant must plug his well. The court 
suggested that the defendant would not have been obligated to take affirmative action to benefit 
the plaintiff if the plaintiffs inability to produce oil was merely the result of "inaction" by the 
defendant. But here the defendant had created the opening that was interfering with the 
55 Id. at 562. 
56 Id. at 563. 
57 82 So. 206 (La. 1919). 
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plaintiff's ability to produce oil from the common reservoir. Further, the court suggested that the 
defendant would not be obligated to plug his well if he obtained some benefit from leaving it 
open. But the defendant could not leave the well open merely for the purpose of diminishing the 
plaintiffs ability to produce oil. 
3. Conservation Statutes and Regulations 
In addition to serving as a justification for the above-noted judicial limitations on the rule 
of capture, the correlative rights doctrine also is one of the justifications for legislative and 
regulatory measures58 that limit the rule of capture in an effort to address certain problems that it 
can cause. 
There are three notable problems that can arise from the rule of capture. First, because the 
rule gives a landowner an incentive to produce oil or gas as quickly as possible, in order to 
produce those substances before his neighbor does, the rule can prompt persons to drill more 
wells than are necessary to efficiently drain the oil or gas in an area.59 Because drilling wells is 
expensive, excess drilling is a form of economic waste. Second, because it is impossible to 
recover one hundred percent of the oil in a reservoir, some oil always is left in place 
underground, but too rapid a rate of production can lead to lower overall recovery and a greater 
amount of oil left underground than if the individuals in an area were operating at a more 
moderate pace.60 The lower recovery is a form of physical waste. Third, some persons might 
58 Conservation statutes and regulations include such provisions as well-spacing rules, 
restrictions on venting and flaring, limitations on allowable production rates, prorationing, and 
forced pooling. 
59 Gadeco, LLC v. Industrial Com'n of State, 812 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D. 2012); Nunez v. 
Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 960 (La. 1986) (rule of capture encouraged 
indiscriminate drilling). 
60 Nunez, 488 So.2d at 960 (referring to possible waste of reservoir energy and diminished 
ultimate recovery). 
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conclude that it is unfair to divide the proceeds of production in an area based simply on who 
produces the oil or gas first. 61 
Starting in the early 1900s, states began to address these problems with conservation 
statutes and regulations. 62 Three of the most common methods are well spacing rules, setback 
rules, and forced pooling or unitization. Well spacing rules require that the distance between 
wells be at least a minimum distance that is set by statute or regulation. Setback rules require that 
wells generally be located no closer than a specified distance from property lines. "Forced 
pooling" or "unitization" gives regulators the authority to enter an order that designates a 
specified area as a "unit."63 Typically, the size of a unit will be the maximum area that can be 
efficiently drained by one well. Regulators generally will allow only one well to be drilled 
within the unit,64 and they specify that all persons owning mineral rights within the unit will 
share in the proceeds from that well. 
Such conservation rules were challenged as being unconstitutional taking of a person's 
property rights without compensation.65 And indeed conservation rules do restrict a person's 
exercise of his property rights. For example, if he owns land in a forced pool or unit, but some 
61 Cf. Nunez, 488 So.2d at 960 (noting that one goal of conservation regulation can be "to insure 
[Question: did the case really use "insure"? Or did it use "ensure"?] [Yes, it used "insure.' 
KB ] a fair and reasonable participation, by the surface owners in the common pool within the 
f:roducing area"). 
2 Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 960 (La. 1986) (discussing Louisiana 
conservation statutes enacted in early 1900s ). 
63 See, e.g., La. Rev. Stats. 31 :9 and 31: JO. "Pooling" and "unitization" often are used interchangeably, though 
some people use the two words to describe analogous, but distinguishable, types of conservation orders. This article 
will use the two words interchangeably. 
64 A particular unit generally applies only for a specific formation. See, e.g., EOG Resources, 
Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 605 F.3d 260, 262-63 (5th Cir. 2010) (referring to units that 
applied to particular formations beneath the same area of land). Thus, if there are multiple 
productive formations in an area, each at different depths, there may be multiple units that cover 
the same area, though each will apply as to different depths beneath the surface. 
65 Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1943); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 
1938); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576 (1900). 
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other person has received a permit to drill the single well that will be allowed within the unit, the 
first individual may be barred from drilling on his property. Or, if a person has drilled a unit 
well, but he owns only some of the property in the unit, he will be forced to share the proceeds of 
his well's production with the other persons who own property in the unit. But courts upheld 
such conservation rules against constitutional challenges.66 In rejecting the constitutional 
challenges, the courts relied in part on the correlative rights doctrine. The courts noted that each 
person who owns rights in a common pool of oil or gas has a right to produce from the common 
pool, but each person's exercise of his right will affect the ability of other persons to exercise 
their rights.67 This, along with the general police power, justifies conservation regulations that 
are designed to avoid waste-both physical and economic-and protect each person's right to 
produce his fair share of oil or gas from the common reservoir. 68 
III. TRESPASS AND THE AD COELUM DOCTRINE 
The extent to which a person has a claim for an alleged subsurface trespass requires 
consideration of the nature of trespass claims, as well as the ad coelum doctrine, which concerns 
a landowner's rights relating to the airspace above his land and the subsurface below it. 
A. Trespass 
66 Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1943); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 
1938); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576 (1900). 
67 Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1943); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 
77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 1938); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576 (1900). 
68 Hunter Co. Inc. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1943); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 
77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 1938); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576 (1900). 
The concept also serves as a basis for a claim that a rule or regulatory order that prevented a 
landowner from developing his resources altogether is a taking of private property. Eugene 
Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. L.J. 1, 7 ( 1958) (citing Railroad Commission 
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)). 
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A trespass is an intrusion onto land in violation of a plaintiffs exclusive right of 
possession.69 A plaintiff must have the right of possession in order to bring a claim in trespass.70 
Typically, a landowner has the right to possess his own land and therefore he will have the right 
to bring a trespass action if someone intrudes without permission.71 If the owner does not possess 
the land, but no one else has established possession, the landowner has constructive possession 
and therefore could bring an action in trespass against an intruder.72 
Although "trespass" often is described as an intrusion onto land, the law recognizes that a 
trespass also can occur by intrusion into the airspace over land or the subsurface below land. 73 
This is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, for surface possession and ownership to have 
any utility, a landowner typically must have ownership rights and control with respect to some 
distance above and below the surface of the land. For example, if a landowner is going to build 
any structure on his land, the structure will likely project into the airspace above the ground. 
69 Team Enterprises, LLC v. Western Investment Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 912 (9th Cir. 
2011) (under California law, a trespass is "an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession 
of land."); Minch Family LLLP v. Buffalo-Red River Watershed Dist., 628 F.3d 960, 968 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (Minnesota law); W. Page Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at 
Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 77) (5th ed. 1984). 
70 Florig v. Estate of O'Hara, 912 A.2d 318, 327 n.13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); see also W. Page 
Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 77) (5th ed. 1984). 
71 Babb v. Lee County Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 473 (S.C. 2013); Johnson v. 
Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 700-1 (Minn. 2012). If the land is 
under lease, the lessee might be the person who has the right to bring a trespass action. Bascom 
v. Dempsey, 9 N.E. 744, 744-5 (Mass. 1887) (lessor who was not in possession could not bring 
trespass action); Ikomoni v. Executive Asset Mgmt., LLC, 709 S.E.2d 282, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2011); Sumrall v. City of East St. Louis, 2013 WL 141694 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2013) (lessee can bring 
trespass action). If someone has established wrongful possession, the landowner may not have a 
claim in trespass, but if his ownership has not been lost by adverse possession he may have the 
right to bring an ejectment action or a petitory action to force the possessor to leave. W. Page 
Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 77) (5th ed. 1984); La. 
Code Civ. Proc. art. 3651. 
72 W. Page Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 77) (5th ed. 
1984). 
73 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 159; Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93 (Iowa 1902) 
(airspace); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950) (subsurface). 
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Further, a foundation may need to project into the subsurface, and it often is useful or necessary 
to have utility lines, basements, and water wells constructed into the subsurface. 
Second, recognizing such intrusions as trespasses is consistent with the notion that 
trespass actions are designed to vindicate a person's possessory interest. If a person is in actual 
possession of the surface of land, he necessarily will be using and occupying at least some 
minimum amount of airspace above and subsurface below the surf ace. For example, if a person 
exercises possession of land by using it and constructing a house on it, that person is using and 
occupying the airspace to an elevation at least as tall as the house, and his actual possession 
probably should be deemed to include some reasonable distance above the highest elevation that 
he is using. 
A similar argument can be made with respect to the subsurface. And even if the owner74 
has not built structures that project below the surface, or any structures whatsoever, he needs 
some minimum amount of ground beneath the surface to support his own weight. If someone 
tunneled beneath the owner's subsurface to within an inch of the ground, the surface would 
collapse. Thus, a person's possessory interest would not be secure and might be vulnerable to 
undue interference if his possession was deemed to end immediately above and below the space 
he is actually using. Finally, noise or other effects of airspace or subsurface intrusions might 
interfere with the landowner's use and enjoyment of his land, even if it did not directly and 
physically interfere. 
74 Although the right to bring a trespass claim is based on possession, not ownership, this article 
sometimes will refer to the "owner" or "landowner" as the person who has or might have a 
trespass claim. 
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The principle that intrusions into the airspace above land or the subsurface below land 
has been recognized in numerous cases, as illustrated by cases discussed below in Section 
III(B ) __ of this article. 
B. The Ad Coelum Doctrine and its Application in Trespass Cases 
Few landowners exercise actual possession of the regions far above or below the surface. 
But a landowner might have constructive possession of such regions, and thus have a remedy 
against intrusions into the airspace above or the subsurface below his land, assuming that he 
owns those regions. 
Further, a literal interpretation of a traditional maxim of the common law suggests that a 
landowner does own such regions. Prominent common law commentators and numerous 
American courts have expressed a maxim known as the ad ceolum doctrine, which seems to 
provide that the owner of land owns not just the surface, but the entire airspace above it and the 
entire subsurface below it.75 This doctrine's name comes from the Latin phrase "cujus est solum 
ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos," which has been translated as "for whoever owns the soil, 
it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell."76 
On numerous occasions, courts have held that liability for trespass can be based on 
airspace or subsurface intrusions. For example, courts have held that a landowner has an action 
in trespass when some portion of a neighboring building or other construction intrudes into his 
airspace. 77Such intrusions have included eaves,78 comices,79 and roofs80 that project over a 
75 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934). 
76 Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., L.P., 773 F.Supp.2d 640, 645 
(W.D. La. 201 1). 
n See, e. g. , Murphy v. Bolger, 15 A. 365 (Vt. 1888). 
78 Huber v. Stark, 102 N.W. 1 2  (Wis. 1905), cf Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb.(N.Y.) 400 (N.Y. 
1863) (ejectment action). 
79 Harrington v. McCarthy, 48 N.E. 278 (Mass. 1897). 
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plaintiffs property. Courts have held that wires passing over a plaintiffs property can constitute 
a trespass,81 and one court held that a defendant committed a trespass when she extended her arm 
over the property line. 82 Courts also have recognized that a person commits a trespass when he 
drills a slant well that bottoms below the plaintiffs land. 83 
Notably, the airspace intrusions all occurred relatively near the surface-at elevations 
that the plaintiff was actually using, at elevations close to those the plaintiff was using, or at 
elevations that the plaintiff reasonably could be expected to use. And the subsurface intrusions 
by slant drilling occurred at depths where the plaintiff reasonably could have been expected to 
perform his own oil and gas exploration. What about intrusions at greater elevations or far 
beneath the surface? This raises the question of whether a landowner's ownership really does 
extend all the way to the center of the earth and all the way to the heavens (with .. heavens" 
presumably meaning outer space). 
C. Limitations on the Ad Coelum Doctrine 
If the ad coelum doctrine were applied literally, a landowner might have a viable trespass 
claim for intrusions at high altitudes, far above those he was using or reasonably could be 
expected to use in connection with his land. He might also have claims for trespass in the event 
of a subsurface intrusion, even if the intrusion occurred at a depth he was not using and could not 
reasonably be expected to use. 
80 Murphy v. Bolger, 1 5  A. 365 (Vt. 1888). 
8 1  Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. 2002); Butler v. Frontier 
Telephone Co., 79 N.E. 7 1 6 (N.Y. 1906). 
82Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93 (Iowa 1902). 
83 Wiliams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas 
Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 47 1 (La. 1 944); Alphonzo 
E. Bell Corporation v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 1 67 (Cal. App. 1938). 
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But a clear modem trend in both legal commentary and court decisions is that the ad 
coelum doctrine does not apply literally and that landowners' right to bring trespass claims for 
high-elevation airspace intrusions or deep subsurface intrusions is limited. The cases demonstrate 
that a landowner's rights are limited to the portions of airspace and subsurface that are relatively 
near the surface of the land, and that he does not have a trespass claim absent intrusions into 
those areas. Even then that the landowner might not have a claim for airspace or subsurface 
intrusions absent actual harm or substantial interference with the landowner's reasonably 
foreseeable use and enjoyment of either the land itself or the airspace or the subsurface above 
and below it. 
1. Air travel limitations to the ad coelum doctrine 
It is well-established that a landowner has no cause of action in trespass against persons 
who engage in high-altitude air travel over his property. In Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, the 
plaintiff brought a claim for trespass based on aircraft flying over his land.84 At that time, 
Georgia's Civil Code declared that "the right of the owner of lands extends downward and 
upward indefinitely."85 Further, the Code stated that "the owner of realty having title downwards 
and upwards indefinitely, an unlawful interference with his rights, below or above the surface, 
alike gives him a right of action."86 The Georgia Supreme noted the importance of air travel to 
society,87 but ultimately based its decision on a property rights analysis. 
The court concluded that the relevant provisions of Georgia's Civil Code were based on 
the common law's ad coelum doctrine and therefore should be interpreted as including any 
84 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934). 
85 Id. (citing Ga. Civ. Code (1910) § 3617). 
86 Id. (citing Ga. Civ. Code (1910) § 4477). 
87 Id. at 819. 
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limitations existing within that doctrine. 88 The court analyzed the doctrine and concluded that the 
full, literal expression of the doctrine is mere dicta. The court explained that, "The common-law 
cases from which the ad coelum doctrine emanated were limited to facts and conditions close to 
earth and did not require an adjudication on the title to the mansions in the sky."89 Therefore, the 
pronouncements from such cases were mere dicta with respect to higher altitudes.90 
The Georgia Supreme Court stated that "[p ]ossession is the basis of all ownership" and 
that title to land therefore "can hardly extend above an altitude representing the reasonable 
possibility of man's occupation and domain."91 The court reasoned that a landowner could claim 
possession to the height of any building, and perhaps the landowner could be deemed to hold 
actual possession of the space immediately above the "trees, buildings, and structures affixed to 
the soil."92 Further, if a neighbor constructed a tall building with an overhang projecting over the 
landowner's property, that construction would demonstrate that the space was subject to actual 
possession and therefore the overhang might be the basis for a trespass action. 93 
But flying through the airspace at high altitude is not an act of possession.94 Therefore, 
air travel at low altitude across a person's property might constitute a trespass,95 and the 
88 Id. at 825 ("These provisions of the Code should therefore be construed in the light of the 
authoritative content of the maxim itself."). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 173 S.E. at 825. 
92 Id. at 826. 
93 Id. at 825. 
94 Id.at 825-6. 
95 Id. at 826. 
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operation of aircraft at higher altitudes that actually interferes with a landowner's use of the land 
might constitute a nuisance,96 but air travel at higher altitudes would not constitute a trespass.97 
In other cases in which landowners have complained about aircraft flying over their 
property, courts similarly have concluded that the ad coelum doctrine is dicta to the extent that it 
suggests title to land extends to indefinite altitudes. Accordingly, landowners may be entitled to 
relief if low-altitude flights over their lands cause actual hann or inconvenience, but they are not 
entitled to relief for high altitude flyovers that do not cause hann or inconvenience.98 A 
particularly notable decision is the 1946 United States Supreme Court opinion in United States v. 
Causby.99 
In Causby, a plaintiff who lived near an airfield brought suit, asserting that low-level 
flights had effected a "taking" of his property and that he was entitled to compensation. The 
Court ruled that, under the facts shown, the plaintiff could assert a takings claim because the 
flights seriously impaired the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property, 100 which extends 
upward from the surface to encompass "at least as much of the space above the ground as he can 
96 Id. at 825 (landowner "may complain of any [flights] tending to diminish the free enjoyment 
of the soil," though the air travel might be at altitudes above the altitude subject to possession); 
id. at 826 ("it could be a nuisance" if the air travel causes harm or inconvenience). 
97 The decision is based on a conclusion that ownership does not extend indefinitely upward. If a 
court concluded that ownership extended indefinitely upward, but that constructive possession 
did not, such reasoning might also bar a trespass claim, given that a landowner would not have 
actual possession of high elevations and that a person must have actual or constructive 
possession in order to bring a trespass claim. But if ownership extended indefinitely upward, a 
landowner might be able to bring a claim based on some other theory, such as ejectment. 
98 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 1 70 N.E. 385, 393 (Mass. 1 930) (noting altitude of 
"possible effective possession" as potential limit on trespass claims); Swetland v. Curtiss 
Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 938 (N.D. Ohio 1 930) (noting that decisions suggesting title to land 
extended to indefinite heights did not involve disputes over alleged trespasses at altitudes 
generally used in air travel); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 266 N.Y.S. 469, 471 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1933) ("[ l] t  may be confidently stated that, if [the ad coelum] maxim ever meant that the owner 
of land owned the space above the land to an indefinite height, it is no longer the law."). 
99 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062 ( 1 946). 
100 328 U.S. at 266-7, 66 S. Ct. at 1 068. 
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occupy or use in connection with the land."
101 But the Court also suggested a landowner would 
not have grounds to complain about the mere fact that aircraft fly over his property at high 
altitudes. The Court explained that the "[ad coelum] doctrine has no place in the modem world," 
and the "public interest" requires that the air be a "public highway."102 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts reaches a similar result. Section 1 59 establishes a 
general rule that trespasses may occur "above the surface of the earth," but the Section also states 
that an aircraft's flight over land will not constitute a trespass unless the aircraft "enters into the 
immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and . . .  it substantially interferes with the 
other's use and enjoyment of his land."
103 
2. Injection disposal exceptions to the ad coelum doctrine 
Many liquid wastes are discarded in injection disposal wells. 1
04 
The process is the 
opposite of what happens in the production of oil from an oil well or water from a water well. 
1 01  328 U.S. at 264, 66 S. Ct. at 1 067. 102 328 U.S. at 26 1,  66 S. Ct. at 1 065. See also 328 U.S. at 266, 66 S. Ct. at 1068 ("The airspace, 
apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain."). The Ohio 
Supreme Court applied the reasoning that the ad coelum doctrine does not apply in its full literal 
expression in support of its holding that a plaintiff did not have a takings claim based on a zoning 
law that limited heights of buildings near an airport. Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 
278 N.E.2d 658, 664 (Ohio 1972) ("It is now well settled that the doctrine of the common law, 
that the ownership of land extends to the periphery of the universe, has no place in the modem 
world."). Such reasoning goes further than the decisions that hold that a landowner's ownership 
does not extend beyond the height he can reasonably possess, but is consistent with the 
firoposition that the ad coelum doctrine is not applied literally. 03 The Restatement (First) Torts is similar. Section 1 59 states that a trespass can occur "above 
the surface of the earth," but Section 194 provides that air travel over land will not constitute a 
trespass if the travel complies with applicable regulation and it has a legitimate purpose, is 
conducted in a reasonable manner, and occurs "at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably 
with the possessor's enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space above it." 
104See EPA webpage, "Basic Information about Injection Wells," available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/basicinformation.cfm#what_is. Section C of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act governs underground injections. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)-(b). More than 
650,000 injection wells have been granted permits to operate under the Safe Drinking Water Act. 
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The liquid waste is pumped down a well that has been drilled to a permeable formation. The 
waste exits the well and migrates into the formation. Over time, as more and more waste liquid is 
injected into the disposal well, the waste fluid can migrate across subsurface property lines. 
In a handful of cases, plaintiffs have filed lawsuits, alleging that a neighbor's operation of 
an injection disposal well has resulted in a subsurface trespass of waste fluids. The trend in such 
suits is for courts to hold that a plaintiff cannot maintain a subsurface trespass action merely 
based on the migration of waste fluids into the subsurface of his property. Instead, a plaintiff 
must be able to show actual damages or an interference with some reasonably anticipated use of 
his property in order to sustain a trespass action.105 
For example, in Chance v. BP Chemicals. Inc., the plaintiffs brought a class action, 
asserting trespass claims that were based on allegations that fluids from the defendant's  injection 
disposal well had intruded into the subsurface of the plaintiffs' properties. 106 After a jury 
returned a verdict finding that the plaintiffs had not proven actual damages or an unreasonable 
interference with a foreseeable use of their properties, the trial court entered judgment for the 
defendant.1 07 The appellate court affirmed and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the 
case. 
The plaintiffs argued that proof of a subsurface intrusion is sufficient to prove a trespass 
and that once a trespass is proven damages could be presumed. ros The Ohio Supreme Court 
disagreed. The court declared that the ad coelum doctrine "has no place in the modern world."109 
See EPA webpage, "UIC Inventory by State - 201 1 ," available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/uicinventorybystate201 1.  pdf. 
105 See, e.g. , West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Assn. v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1 950). 
106 670 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio 1996). 
1 07 Id. at 989. 
108 Id. at 993. 
109 Id. at 991 (citing Winston v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477, 478 (1832)). 
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The court then quoted with approval a case in which the Ninth Circuit stated that a person's 
ownership of the airspace above his land extends only so far as the space he can use and 
occupy. 1 1 0  The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that similar reasoning should be extended to 
subsurface rights. 1 1 1  Therefore, in  order for litigants to  recover in  trespass for the sort of 
subsurface intrusion alleged by the plaintiffs, they must prove "physical damage or actual 
interference with the reasonable and foreseeable use of the properties."1 1 2  Because the plaintiffs 
had not proven damages or interference with use, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
against them.1 1 3 
In Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, the plaintiffs brought suit under 
Louisiana law, asserting a trespass claim based on the allegation that the salt water from the 
defendant's injection disposal well had intruded into the subsurface of their property.1 14 The 
United States Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not established an actionable trespass. 1 1 5 
1 1 0  Id. at 991-2. 
1 1 1  Id. at 992. The court also observed that "ownership rights in today's world are not s o  clear-cut 
as they were before the advent of airplanes and injection wells." Id. 
1 12 Id. at 993. 
1 1 3  Id. at 994. See also Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009 WL 3698419  (S.D. Ohio 2009). In a 
Kansas case, the plaintiffs complained about an escape of natural gas from a storage facility. The 
plaintiffs proceeded on negligence and nuisance claims only, after voluntarily dismissing their 
trespass claims, so trespass claims were not at issue, but the Kansas Supreme Court referred to 
the Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of the plaintiff's trespass theory in Chance v. BP and stated 
that in Kansas the result likely would be the same-a plaintiff could not recover for subsurface 
trespass without showing damages or unreasonable interference with a foreseeable use of his 
property. Smith v. Kansas Gas Service Co., 1 69 P.3d 1052, 1061  (Kan. 2007). In a dispute over 
subsurface water flows, the Colorado Supreme Court suggested that it found the reasoning of the 
Ohio Supreme Court to be persuasive, though the Colorado court's decision appears to have been 
based in large part on Colorado water law. Board of County Commissioners v. Park County 
Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002). 
1 14 255 F.3d 271, 272 (5th Cir 2001). 
1 1 5  Id. at 274. The court seemed to put some weight on the fact that the defendant had received a 
permit from the Louisiana Department of Conservation to operate the injection disposal well, but 
that generally should not be a basis for distinguishing the typical cross-border fracturing case 
because in most or all states the operator of the well will have been required to secure a permit in 
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The court reasoned that Louisiana law would not allow recovery for subsurface intrusion unless 
the plaintiff could show actual damages or "measurable inconvenience." 1 16 Because the plaintiffs 
had not proven either of those things, they had failed to establish an actionable trespass. 1 1 7 The 
mere existence of a physical intrusion was not sufficient. 
A respected torts hombook espouses a similar view. The hombook criticizes a 1929 
Kentucky decision in which the court, "notwithstanding a forceful dissenting opinion," allowed a 
surface owner to recover in trespass on the grounds that the defendant had entered the subsurface 
of plaintiffs land via a case at a depth of 360 feet below the surface. 1 1 8 Noting that the plaintiff 
had no practical access to the case and no prospect for access, the hombook characterizes the 
decision as "very bad" and as being "dog-in-the-manger law." 1 19 The hombook states that relief 
should not be allowed in such cases unless there is some damage to the surf ace or some 
interference with a plaintiffs use of the property. 120 Turning to subsurface intrusions caused by 
injection disposal and gas storage, the hombook notes that "[p ]erhaps there should be no liability 
for subsurface invasions of water, gas, or other substances" unless the plaintiff can prove actual 
order to drill the well. Prior to Boudreaux, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana rejected claims in two similar cases based on the same reasoning. Mongrue 
v. Monsanto, 1999 WL 970354 (E.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001); Raymond v. 
Union Texas Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1988). 
1 1 6 Id. at 275. 
1 1 1 Id. 
1 1 8 W. Page Keeton, et al. ,  PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 82) (5th ed. 
1984). 
1 1 9 Id. The "dog-in-the-manger" reference is derived from the Aesop's Fable in which a dog 
refuses to let an ox eat hay from a feed trough even though the dog itself cannot eat hay. 
1 20 Id. 
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damages, an interference with his use of the property, or, when oil and gas rights are involved, 
the "unjustifiabl[e] appropriat[ion]" of products. 12 1 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that a trespass can occur below the 
surface, 122 but this does not necessarily mean that the Restatement would impose liability for 
intrusions by injections resulting from injection disposal. Liability for trespass is based on 
entering land "in the possession of the other." 1 23 The Restatement provides that, to be in 
possession of land, a person must be in "occupancy" of it. 1 24 The comments explain that 
"occupancy" means "such acts done upon the land as manifest a claim of exclusive control of the 
land," and as an example, the comments note that a person's construction of an enclosure around 
land generally will qualify as occupancy of the entire area enclosed. 1 25 In the typical case in 
which a landowner complains about injection disposal, the defendant can likely make a strong 
argument that the complaining landowner does not have possession of the land at the depths 
where the injection disposal is being done. 
3 .  Conservation Regulation Exceptions to the Ad Coelum Doctrine 
Although a company generally has no right to conduct operations on or beneath land 
unless he owns or leases the land, courts sometimes have found that statutory pooling or 
unitization of the type described by this article in section II(B)(3) can create an exception to this 
1 2 1 Id. at 82. In section VI(A), this article explains why, at least in certain circumstances, 
drainage of oil and gas that is facilitated by cross-boundary fracturing should not be considered 
an "unjustifiable appropriation." 
1 22 Restatement (Second) Torts § 158. The Restatement (First) of Torts has a similar provision in 
Section 159. 
1 23 Restatement (Second) Torts § 158. Similarly, Restatement (First) of Torts § 1 62 states 
trespass liability is owed [is "owned" the right word here?] [No, it should be "owed."] only to 
rersons in possession of land. 
24 Restatement (Second) Torts § 1 57. Restatement (First) of Torts § 157 has a similar definition 
of "possession." 
1 25 Restatement (Second) Torts § 157 comment (a). Restatement (First) Torts § 157 comment (a) 
has a similar definition of "occupancy." 
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mle. Thus, in the same way that unitization can provide exceptions to the mle of capture, 
unitization can modify mles relating to trespass. In Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 1 26 the 
Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation entered orders creating a compulsory unit and issued a 
permit authorizing an operator to drill a well that became the unit well. The drilling began on 
leased property, near an unleased tract that was part of the unit. After the well was completed. a 
directional survey indicated that the drilling had deviated from vertical and that the well had 
bottomed about four or five feet inside the subsurface of the unleased tract. The owner of that 
neighboring tract brought a trespass action against the operator and other defendants who owned 
mineral interests in the unit, seeking an order that required the operator to remove the wellbore. 
The district court dismissed the action, concluding that it was an improper collateral 
attack on an order of the Commissioner of Conservation. The appellate court reversed, and 
remanded the case so that the district court could determine whether a trespass occurred. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court granted review and dismissed the case, but on different grounds than 
the district court had done so. 
The Supreme Court stated that compulsory unitization converts the separate exploration 
and development rights held by different persons within the dril ling unit into a common interest 
for the drilling and development of the unit. 1 27 The court described the common interest as "a 
departure from the traditional notions of private property." 128 The court then explained that this 
departure is justified as a "reasonable exercise of the police power" because oil and gas "migrate 
to points of lower pressure caused by . . .  drilling," so that one person's production of oil or gas 
affects "the correlative rights" of others who have exploration and development rights that apply 
1 26 488 So.2d 955 (La. 1986). 
1 27 Id. at 961-2. 
1 28 /d. 
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to the "common reservoir." 129 Indeed, unitization "protect[s] private property [by] preventing it 
from being taken by one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of the 
others." 130 
The court noted that this had "supercede[d] in part" Louisiana's rule that the surface 
owner also owns the subsurface, and that the trespass alleged by the plaintiff was a 
subsurface trespass, not a surface trespass. The court then concluded: "Since established 
privale property law concepts, such as trespass, have been superceded in part by 
Louisiana's Conservation Law when a unit has been created by order of the 
Commissioner, we do not find that a legally actionable trespass has occurred in this 
instance." 1 3 1  
In  a subsequent dispute between Nunez and Wainoco, the Louisiana Third Circuit applied 
the same principle in concluding that unitization orders and the grant of a drilling permit for a 
particular location can also alter the rules relating to surface trespass. In that subsequent dispute, 
Nunez complained about Wainoco used a portion of his land while drilling a well just on the 
other side of the property line. Using a portion of Nunez's surface during the drilling process had 
been necessary because, although the well site was not on Nunez's  property, the site designated 
on the drilling permit was near the property line. The appellate court stated that an operator 
might be required to compensate the non-consenting landowner for any damages to his property, 
but the mere use of his land is not a basis for trespass liability if use of the land is necessary in 
order to drill a unit well at the location specified by the Commissioner of Conservation. 
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the operator of a pooled unit even 
has the right to drill a unit well at a surface location owned by a landowner who refuses to give 
his consent, 1 32 though the owner might be entitled to compensation for the value of such use 
1 29 Id. at 962-3. 
1 30 Id. at 963 (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 ( 1900)). 
1 3 1 Id. at 964. 
1 32 Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Rein, 534 P.2d 1 277 (Okla. 1975), 
3 1  
under the Takings Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution. 1 33 Further, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has held that, when the state's regulators have created a compulsory unit, an operator does 
not incur liability for trespass by drilling a horizontal well beneath the property of an unleased 
owner without that owner's consent. 134 
4. The Rule of Capture. Ownership-in-place, and Non-ownership 
Sometimes, a plaintiff complains that a portion of the oil and gas being produced from a 
neighbor's well is being drained from beneath the plaintiffs land. All states that have addressed 
such dispues have applied the rule of capture, holding that a person obtains ownership of all oil 
or gas he produces from a well on his property, even if some of the oil or gas he produces is 
drained from adjacent land, and that he does not incur liability to the neighboring landowners 
because of such production. 1 35 Sometimes it has been suggested that the rule of capture itself is a 
limitation on the ad coelum doctrine because, at least in certain circumstances, it protects a 
person from liability for conducting operations that result in drainage of oil or gas from adjoining 
properties. 
Some address this issue by adhering to a "non-ownership" conception of a landowner's 
rights with respect to oil and gas located "in place" beneath his property. The jurisprudence of 
those states hold that a landowner generally has the exclusive right to conduct operations on his 
property for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals, but that he does not own the 
1 33 Cormack v. Wil-Mc Corp., 661 P.2d 525, 526-7 (Okla. 1983) (citing Okla. Const. art. 2, sec. 
23). 
1 34 Continental Resources, Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841 ,  846 (N.D. 1997). The cases 
discussed in this section of the article do not figure prominently in the eventual "Model" that this 
article suggests is the appropriate synthesis of existing subsurface trespass rules, but these cases 
support the conclusion that that are numerous exceptions to a literal application of the ad coelum 
doctrine. 
1 35 Terence Daintith, Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil Industry 7 
(RFF Press 2010) 
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oil and gas in place beneath his land.1 36 Thus, if a neighbor who is operating on adjoining 
property drains oil or gas from beneath the landowner's property, the neighbor has not taken or 
interfered with the landowner's property or ownership rights. Under such a legal theory, the rule 
of capture is not inconsistent with the ad coelum doctrine, though someone might argue that a 
state's decision to adhere to a non-ownership theory is in itself a compromise or limitation on the 
ad coelum doctrine. 
On the other hand, there are some states that follow the rule of capture, but nevertheless 
operate under a theory that a landowner owns the oil and gas in place beneath his property.137 
The states reconcile their ownership-in-place theory with the rule of capture by holding that a 
landowner's ownership of oil and gas is lost once those substances migrate from beneath his land 
and that he generally has no cause of action against a neighbor whose oil or gas well has caused 
such drainage.1 38 This reconciliation could be viewed as simply a limitation on the nature of 
136 Arrowhead Energy, Inc. v. Baron Exploration Co., 930 P.2d 181, 182 n. l (Oki. 1996); Bonner 
v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1185 (Oki. 1993); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 
471, 474 (La. 1944); La. Rev. Stat. 31:6. In such states, a person acquires ownership of the oil or 
gas when he reduces them to possession. See, e. g. La. Rev. Stats: 31:6 - 7. Those same states 
sometimes hold that a landowner does own the solid minerals in place beneath his land. See, e.g. , 
La. Rev. Stat 31 :5. 
1 37 Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S. W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948). 
1 38 Id.; see also Halbouty v. Railroad Commission, 357 S.W.2d 364, 375 (Tex. 1962) (referring 
to "harmoniz[ing]" the rule of capture and ownership-in-place concepts). Because all states hold 
that a landowner generally has the exclusive right to use his property for exploration and 
production, and all apply the rule of capture with respect to drainage, it makes little difference in 
most circumstances whether a state is a non-ownership state or an ownership-in-place state. The 
difference in theory can make a difference in some contexts. For example, arguably it might 
make a difference in the measure of damages when a landowner asserts a damages claim against 
his lessee for breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage or whether certain 
mineral rights can be lost by abandonment. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kramer and Owen L. Anderson, 
The Rule of Capture: An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 Envtl. L. 899, 949 (2005); Gerhard v. 
Stephens, 442 P.2d 692, 703-4 (Cal. 1968). 
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ownership of oil and gas in place, but it also could be viewed as a limitation on a strict 
application of the ad coelum doctrine. 1 39 
5. Disputes Involving Secondary Recovery and Similar Production Methods 
Disputes regarding secondary recovery present interesting issues regarding the rule of 
capture, correlative rights, and trespass. 
"Primary recovery" refers to the initial stages of production of oil from a reservoir. 
Because a large portion of oil remains in the ground after primary recovery, companies 
sometimes engage in secondary recovery in order to recover additional oil. One type of 
secondary recovery is waterflooding. In waterflooding, several injection wells are used for 
pumping water into the reservoir that contains oil, to push or flush toward a recovery well a 
portion of the oil that remains in the ground after primary recovery. 140 
Secondary recovery can significantly increase total recovery and is highly favored as a 
matter of public policy. 14 1 But while total recovery is increased, the pumping of water into the 
reservoir can cause some wells that are still producing oil to "water out." Thus, disputes can arise 
if one or more parties are conducting secondary recovery operations that adversely impact 
another person's well and that person either is not receiving a share of the production from the 
139 Some have criticized the ownership-in-place doctrine as being a legal fiction, suggesting that 
a more accurate description of the landowner's rights is presented by the states that follow a non­
ownership theory. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 979, 1009- 10 (2008) (describing ownership-in-place theory as being "purely rhetorical" and 
stating that it is "not ownership at all"); see also Terence Daintith, Finders Keepers? How the 
Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil Industry 3 1 -2 (RFF Press 2010) (describing ownership-in­
place theory "inconsistent" with the rule of capture followed throughout the U.S. and referring to 
the "problem of how you could have full ownership-or indeed, any meaningful ownership at 
all-of a thing that someone could take from you with impunity"). If ownership-in-place is a 
legal fiction, that undercuts an argument that the rule of capture is an exception to the ad coelum 
doctrine, as noted above in the discussion of the non-ownership theory. 
140 Railroad Commission v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1962) (describing 
waterflooding operation). 
14 1 Railroad Commission v. Manzie), 36 1 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962). 
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secondary recovery operation or believes his share does not adequately compensate for the 
watering out of his well. 
In Railroad Commission v. Manziel, plaintiffs challenged an order of the Texas Railroad 
Commission that authorized certain secondary recovery operations that the plaintiffs alleged 
would cause a subsurface trespass that would water out one of their wells. 142 The Texas Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiffs had no trespass claim. The court noted that secondary recovery is 
highly favored, that the disputed operation had been approved by regulators, and that regulators 
have authority to enter orders to maximize production, minimize waste, and protect correlative 
rights. 1 43 The court upheld the order, 144 and concluded that "a trespass does not occur" if a 
secondary recovery operation that has been approved by the Railroad Commission pushes fluids 
across subsurface property lines. 145 
But some other courts have been reluctant to insulate secondary recovery operations from 
liability for trespass, particularly if the plaintiff was not included in the unit and therefore did not 
share in the proceeds from the secondary recovery operation. 146 Also notable are a series of 
bromine production cases from Arkansas. Bromine is an element that is used for a variety of 
purposes, including the manufacture of flame retardants. 147 It is found in salt water-both in 
14
2 Id. at 561 -2. 
143 Id. at 568-9. 
144 Id. at 574. 
145 Id. at 568-9; see also Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002). Such a rule is consistent 
with what one prominent authority called "negative rule of capture," which would provide that 
an operator would not incur liability for the injection of substances, even if such injection 
"results in the displacement under [the land of others] of more valuable with less valuable 
substances." Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS 
LAW § 204.5. 
146 See, e.g. , Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS 
LAW § 204.5 (discussing several cases). 
147 Albemarle Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 2007 WL 45895 15  *3 (M.D.La. 2007). 
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seawater and in many subsurface brines. 148 A high concentration of bromine-meaning about 
3 ,000 to 5,000 parts per million-is found in brines located about 8,500 feet below the surface in 
certain areas of Arkansas. 149 
Often bromine-rich brine is recovered in an operation that is very similar to 
waterflooding. 150 Bromine-rich "virgin brine" is produced from production wells, much of the 
bromine is recovered, and then "spent brine" that has a lower concentration of bromine is 
pumped down injection wells that push more virgin brine toward the production wells. 1 5 1  This 
results in a greater flow of virgin brine to the production wells than would result if operators 
merely pumped brine from the production wells. 1 52 
In a handful of cases, courts in Arkansas have heard disputes relating to such "secondary 
recovery" of brine. In Budd v. Ethyl Corporation, the defendants held mineral leases on a block 
of land about 16,000 acres. 1 53 They operated a brine production operation that utilized a number 
of injection wells on the periphery of the block and a number of production wells in the interior 
of the block. 1 54 A plaintiff brought suit, asserting a right to a share of proceeds from the 
defendants' brine production, based on his interests in two separate tracts of land, which the 
court stated "must be discussed separately." 1 55 
148 /d. 
1 49 /d. 
1 50 Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 1 192, 1 1 94 (W.D. Ark. 
1 998). 
1 s 1  Id. 
1 52 /d. 
1 53 474 S .W.2d 4 1 1 ,  412  (Ark. 1972). 
1 54 Id. 
1 ss Id. 
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The first was a 240-acre tract in which the plaintiff held an undivided one thirty-sixth 
interest in the minerals. 1 56 The tract was located adjacent to, but outside of, the defendants' lease 
block. 1 57 The plaintiff argued that, even though the tract was outside the defendants' ring of 
injection wells, the defendants' operations were draining brine from beneath the 240-acre 
tract. 1 58 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that the rule of trespass barred 
the claim. 1 59 Thus, the court established that the rule of capture generally will apply to the 
production of brine under Arkansas law. The second tract was a forty-acre tract located inside the 
defendants' ring of injection wells. 160 The court did not have to decide whether the rule of 
capture would apply in the "secondary recovery" context because it rejected the plaintiffs claim 
relating to the second tract on other grounds. 16 1 
But that issue was litigated several years later in Jameson v. Ethyl Corporation. 1 62 The 
plaintiff owned land inside the ring of injection wells operated for the secondary recovery of 
brine. 1 63 The operator of the wells previously had attempted to obtain a lease from the plaintiff 
on terms similar to those in the operator's other leases in the area, but the parties could not reach 
an agreement. 164 The operator filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that its operations were 
protected by the rule of capture. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that "the rule of capture should not be extended 
insofar as operations relate to lands lying within the peripheral area affected" by secondary 
156 Id. 
1 57 Id. at 4 12. 
1 58 Id. 
159 Id. at 4 12-3. 
160 Id. at 413 .  
16 1 Id. at 413-4. 
162 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980). 
163 Id. at 349. 
164 Id. at 347, 348. 
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recovery operations. 165 The court concluded that applying the rule of capture in the context of 
secondary recovery would give extraction companies too much bargaining power in their 
dealings with landowners. 1 66 
But the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the defendant' s  actions should not be 
classified as a trespass. 167 The court found that secondary recovery operations are important to 
society as a means of maximizing recovery of brine, and that brine which is otherwise 
recoverable would be "wasted if a single landowner is able to thwart secondary recovery 
processes." 168 Accordingly, the court held that secondary recovery operations "should be 
permitted, when such operations are carried out in good faith for the purpose of maximizing 
recovery from a common pool," but that a company conducting such operations would be 
obligated "to compensate the owner of the depleted lands for the minerals extracted in excess of 
natural depletion, if any, at the time of taking and for any special damages which may have been 
caused to the depleted property." 169 In effect, the court jurisprudentially provided authority for 
unitization or pooling for secondary recovery. 170 
165 Id. at 35 l .  
166 Id. 
167 Id. ar35 l .  In a prior decision, the United States Eighth Circuit had faced the same question 
and had made an Erie-guess that the Arkansas Supreme Court would conclude that subsurface 
intrusions caused by secondary recovery operations did constitute a trespass. See Young v. Ethyl 
Corporation, 521 F.2d 77 1 (8th Cir. 1975). 
1 68 Id. 
1 69 Id. at 35 1  By "natural depletion," the court apparently meant the amount of depletion, if any, 
that would have occurred if the extraction company had conducted only primary recovery 
operations. See id. at 349 (discussing "normal drainage" that would have occurred in the absence 
of the operator's injection wells). A subsequent federal district court decision reached the same 
conclusion regarding what is meant by "natural depletion." See Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great 
Lakes Chem. Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1 192, 1 195 (W.D. Ark. 1998). 
1 70 It is not clear if the court thought in terms of providing for unitization, but the court stated: 
"While Arkansas' unitization laws are not, as previously noted, involved in this case, we do 
believe that the underlying rationale for the adoption of such laws, i.e., to avoid waste and 
provide for maximizing recovery of mineral resources, may be interpreted as expressing a public 
38  
Thus, courts have reached different conclusions regarding the rights of parties in 
secondary recovery disputes, though there seems to be a trend against classifying subsurface 
intrusions caused by secondary recovery operations as being trespasses. 
6. Subsurface Trespass Cases Outside the Mineral Law Context 
Although a large portion of subsurface trespass disputes arise in the context of mineral 
recovery or injection disposal operations, such disputes can arise in other contexts. For example, 
in Boehringer v. Montalto, the plaintiff sold property to the defendant on credit, taking a 
mortgage and giving a warranty that the property was free from encumbrances. 1 7 1  The plaintiff 
later brought an action to foreclose on the mortgage and the defendant counterclaimed, alleging 
that the plaintiff had breached the warranty because the property was not free from 
encumbrances. 172 Evidence showed that the Bronx Valley Sewer Commission previously had 
constructed the sewer beneath the property at a depth of about 1 50 feet, after acquiring the right 
to do so by condemnation. 1 73 The Commission had not acquired any right to access the sewer via 
the surface of the property that the plaintiff had sold to the defendant. 174 
After briefly taking note of prior disputes regarding ownership of airspace above the 
property, the court stated that, "It therefore appears that the old theory that the title of an owner 
of real property extends indefinitely upward and downward is no longer an accepted principle of 
law in its entirety."175 The court concluded that "the title of an owner of the soil will not be 
policy of this State which is pertinent to the rule of law of this case." Id. at 35 1 .  The court noted 
that, subsequent to the start of the litigation, Arkansas enacted legislation authorizing statutory 
unitization for the production of brine. Id. at 350 n. 1 .  Before, Arkansas had not provided a 
statutory basis for unitization for the production of brine. Budd, 474 S.W.2d at 4 1 3. 
17 1  254 N.Y.S. 276, 276 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 193 1) .  
1 72 Id. at 276-7. 
1 73 Id. at 277. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 278. 
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extended to a depth below ground beyond which the owner may not reasonably make use 
thereof." 176 The court concluded that the Bronx Valley sewer was located below the deepest 
depth that the defendant "can conceivably make use of the property." 177 Accordingly, the Bronx 
Valley sewer and the Commission's easement did not encumber the defendant's  property. 1 78 
D. Summary 
Courts recognize trespass claims for airspace and subsurface intrusions that occur 
relatively near the surface of the earth. Further, courts continue to repeat the ad coelum doctrine, 
which states that a landowner owns the subsurface beneath his land all the way to the center of 
the earth and the airspace above his property all the way into space. But the full, literal 
expression of the ad coelum doctrine is dicta. No court has ever applied the doctrine in a case in 
which parties disputed rights anywhere near the center of the earth or the outer reaches of space. 
Further, when the courts have faced disputes regarding high elevation and deep subsurface 
intrusions, they typically have held that a plaintiff cannot recover in trespass unless the intrusion 
occurred at an elevation or depth that the plaintiff reasonably could be expected to use, or the 
intrusion caused actual harm or interfered with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property. 
Thus, the literal expression of the ad coelum doctrine is not well-established law, but instead is 
merely oft-repeated dicta. 1 79 
176 /d. 
1 11 Id. 
178 /d. 
1 79 Numerous courts and commentators have reached similar conclusions. W. Page Keeton, et al., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at Ch. 3, § 13 (p. 79) (5th ed. 1984) (describing doctrine 
as "dictum" and stating that, "No one now advocates that it be applied literally . . . . "); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260- 1 ( 1946) ([ad coelum] doctrine has no place in the modem 
world"); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 1 59 comment g (noting that the doctrine "has been 
repeated in many cases in which there has been no question of anything more than the immediate 
space above the ground" and that the doctrine "can no longer be regarded as law, if it ever was"); 
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y.S. 469, 47 1 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1933) ("it may 
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IV. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING INTRUSION CASES 
The two most important hydraulic fracturing trespass cases are Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. 
v. Garza Energy Trust, which is a 2008 decision from the Texas Supreme Court, and Stone v. 
Chesapeake Appalachia. LLC, a diversity jurisdiction case decided by the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. But there are a handful of earlier cases from 
Texas that provide interesting background. Those pre-Garza Texas cases are briefly discussed 
below, followed by discussions of Garza and Stone. 
A. Pre-Garza Texas Cases 
In Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., an oil and gas lessee brought suit to enjoin the 
operator of an adjoining property from performing a hydraulic fracturing operation that the 
plaintiff believed would result in fractures crossing the property line. 1 80 The plaintiff asserted 
that the cross-border fracturing would constitute a subsurface trespass. 1 8 1 The case went to the 
Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case, 
or whether the Texas Railroad Commission had primary jurisdiction. 1 82 The Texas Supreme 
Court decided the only issue that was before it, the jurisdiction question, by holding that the 
district court had jurisdiction, 1 83 but the court's  opinion also contained dicta suggesting that a 
subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid would constitute a trespass. 1 84 A companion case, Delhi-
be confidently stated that, if [the ad coelum] doctrine ever meant that the owner of land owned 
the space above the land to an indefinite height, it is no longer the law"). 
1 80 344 S.W.2d 4 1 1 ,  412  (Tex. 1961 ). 
1 8 1  Id. 
1 82 Id. 
1 83 Id. at 412, 4 19. 
1 84 Id. at 4 16  ("The pleadings allege a physical entrance into Delhi-Taylor's leasehold. While the 
drilling bit of Gregg's  well is not alleged to have extended into Delhi-Taylor's land, the same 
result is reached if in fact the cracks or veins extend into its land and gas is produced therefrom 
by Gregg. To constitute a trespass, 'entry upon another's land need not be in person, but may be 
made by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the premises."'). 
4 1  
Taylor Oil Corporation v. Holmes, presented the same jurisdictional issue and was decided in a 
short opinion that cited Gregg. 185 
In Geo Viking. Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., the owner of a well hired a service 
company to perform hydraulic fracturing. 1 86 Due to equipment problems, the fracture did not 
extend as far as designed, and the owner of the well sued the service company for damages. 187 
The jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the owner of the well. 1 88 The service company 
appealed, in part based on the trial court's rejection of its argument that the owner of the well 
could not recover damages for the entire difference between the design fracture length and the 
actual fracture length. 1 89 The service company argued that recovery for the entire distance was 
improper because the designed fracture length would have extended into a neighboring property, 
thereby committing a trespass and facilitating the recovery of natural gas that the operator of the 
well had no right to produce. 190 
The appellate court rejected the service company's argument, concluding that the 
argument ran counter to the rule of capture. 1 9 1 The court therefore affirmed, with only a minor 
reformation of the judgment regarding an error in the interest calculation. 1 92 The service 
company sought rehearing. The court denied rehearing, but with an interesting split. The author 
of the original opinion changed his mind and dissented from the appellate court's denial of the 
service company's motion for a rehearing, apparently concluding that a subsurface intrusion of 
1 85 344 S.W.2d 420, 42 1 (Tex. 1 96 1 ). 
186 8 1 7  S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 99 1 ), rev 'd, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. 1 992) (per curiam), 
withdrawing per curiam decision and denying writ of error, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992) (per 
curiam). 
1 87 Id. at 359. 
1 88 Id. at 359-60. 
189 Id. at 363-4. 
190 Id. 
19 1 Id. at 364. 
192 Id. 
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fracturing fluid could constitute a trespass after all . 1 93 One of the judges that concurred in the 
denial of rehearing issued a short opinion, stating that an alleged wrongdoer (the service 
company) should not be allowed to raise as a defense to its wrongdoing the fact that the plaintiff 
might not have title to the gas it was seeking to recover. 194 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion that declared. "Fracing under 
the surface of another's land constitutes a subsurface trespass." 195 But the Texas Supreme Court 
later withdrew its initial per curiam decision six months later, issuing a new per curiam 
decision. 196 The new decision superseded the prior per curiam decision and denied the service 
company's request for review. 197 Further, in an apparent effort to make sure that neither the 
initial per curiam decision nor the new decision was given any value as precedent, the new 
decision stated, "In denying petitioner's application for writ of error, we should not be 
understood as approving or disapproving the opinions of the court of appeals analyzing the rule 
of capture or trespass as they apply to hydraulic fracturing." 198 This left in place the appellate 
court opinion. 
Finally, there is Gifford Operating v. Indrex. Inc. , a diversity jurisdiction case decided 
between the first and second per curiam decisions by the Texas Supreme Court in Geo Viking. 199 
In that decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas relied on the 
193 Id. at 364-5 (Grant, J . ,  dissenting from the denial of rehearing). 
1 94 Id. at 364 (Cornelius, J., concurring in denial of rehearing). 
195 1992 WL 80263 *2 (Tex. 1992). 
1 96 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992). 
191 Id. 
1 98 Id. at 798. 
199 1 992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22505 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1992). 
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original per curiam decision to hold that a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid constituted a 
trespass. 200 
B. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust 
In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant had hydraulically fractured wells drilled on land adjacent to the land where the 
plaintiffs owned a royalty interest ("plaintiffs '  land"), and that the fractures created by the 
defendant's operations had intruded into the subsurface of the plaintiffs '  land. 201 The plaintiffs 
sought damages, alleging that the fractures had facilitated the drainage of hydrocarbons from 
beneath their land, and that such drainage had cost them royalty revenue that would have been 
due to them if the hydrocarbons had been produced by a well located on their land, as opposed to 
being produced by the defendant's well on the adjoining property.202 The plaintiffs did not allege 
any damages other than the loss of royalty revenue.203 
The majority stated that the court need not decide whether the cross-border fracturing 
was a trespass because it was clear that there was no "actionable trespass."204 The court 
explained that the plaintiffs could not recover in trespass without injury, and that the rule of 
capture barred any recovery for drainage, which was the only injury alleged by the plaintiffs.205 
The court described the rule of capture as applying whenever a person produces oil or gas "from 
a lawful well bottomed on . . .  property" where the person has a right to operate. 206 
200 Id. 
20 1 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008). 
202 Id. at 8. 
203 Id. at 1 2-3. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 13 .  
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The court justified what its characterized as its adherence to the rule of capture on several 
grounds. First, Garza stated that a landowner has adequate remedies even without having a 
trespass claim-namely, the same remedies that a landowner has when he complains about 
drainage that is caused by a neighboring well that is not hydraulically fractured. For example, he 
can drill an offset well. 207 Or, if his land is under lease, he can demand that his lessee drill an 
offset well and, if the lessee fails to do so, he can bring suit against his lessee for a breach of the 
implied covenant to protect against drainage.208 Or, he can seek forced pooling.209 
Second, the court stated that the preferable way to govern the production of oil and gas is 
for the Texas Railroad Commission to use its regulatory authority to balance the rule of capture 
with appropriate measures to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.2 10 Third, it explained 
that courts are not well-equipped to determine the amount of drainage, or to take into account 
social policies in resolving whether a plaintiff has or does not have a viable claim based on 
subsurface intrusions resulting from hydraulic fracturing.2 1 1  
Finally, the court stated that it had received amicus briefs from groups representing a 
variety of interests. including "regulators, landowners, royalty owners, operators, and hydraulic 
fracturing service providers," and that they had all opposed imposing liability for hydraulic 
fracturing that cross subsurface property lines.2 12 Accordingly, the court concluded that "the law 
of capture should not be changed to apply differently to hydraulic fracturing."21 3  
207 Id. at 14. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
2 10 Id. at 14-5. 
2 1 1  Id. at 16. 
2 12 Id. at 16-7. 
2 1 3  Id. at 16. 
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The result of the decision-that there is no liability for fractures that cross property 
l ines-is defensible, but the court's reasoning seems flawed. The majority concluded that its rule 
of capture analysis was sufficient to decide the case and that the court need not determine 
whether the cross-border fracturing constituted a trespass. But such a conclusion ignores the fact 
that the rule of capture does not necessarily apply if the capture of oil or gas is made possible by 
a trespass or other illegal activity. Indeed, Garza itself recognized that the intrusion of a slant 
well would be a trespass2 14 and that the rule of capture does not necessarily apply if an operator 
facilitates its production of oil by illegal means.2 1 5  Thus, the court could not properly ignore the 
question of whether the defendant had committed a trespass, and if so, how it affected the 
defendant's potential liability.2 1 6 
To be fair, the majority opinion was not wholly lacking in trespass analysis. The majority 
quoted Causby's statement that a literal application of the ad coelum doctrine "has no place in 
the modem world."2 17 The court added, "The law of trespass need no more be the same two 
miles below the surface than two miles above."2 1 8 The court's rejection of a l iteral application of 
the ad coelum doctrine cannot reasonably be assailed, but such a rejection is not the same as 
2 14 Id. at 1 3  n.4. In footnote 4, Garza acknowledged that the Texas Supreme Court held in 
Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 ( 1950) that an operator commits a trespass when it 
drills a well that bottoms on the neighbor's  property. Hastings did not expressly address the 
applicability of the rule of capture when a slant well trespasses, but it did not need to address the 
issue because the court in that case affirmed a lower court ruling that enjoined the operator from 
testing or producing oil from the trespassing well. 234 S.W.2d at 398. 
2 15 268 S.W.3d at 1 3  n.39. Garza cited a prior case in which the Texas Supreme Court affirmed a 
lower court ruling that the rule of capture did not protect an operator who had violated the law by 
illegally using a vacuum pump to facilitate production. Id. (citing Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 
S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Ct. App. 193 1 ), aff'd, 98 S.W.2d 78 1 ( 1936)). 
2 16 Other commentators also have noted this flaw in the majority' s  reasoning. See, e. g. , David E. 
Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing 
Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. Rev. 759, 77 1 -72 (2009) (Professor Pierce refers to this an 
an "obvious flaw" in the court's reasoning). 
2 1 7 Id. at 1 1 . 
2 1 8  Id at 1 1 . 
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analyzing whether a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid constitutes a trespass. In a separate 
section of the opinion, the majority devoted one paragraph to rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that 
cross-border fracturing is the equivalent of drilling a slant well that crosses the property line.2 1 9 
The majority stated that the slant drilling situation is distinguishable from fracturing because the 
capture of oil or gas by a slant well actually occurs under the plaintiffs property, whereas in both 
a traditional rule of capture case and a fracturing trespass case, the oil or gas drains away and the 
actual capture takes place on the operator's property.220 Thus, one can use an offset well to 
combat drainage in the traditional rule of capture case or the fracturing trespass case, whereas an 
offset well cannot protect against a trespassing slant well.22 1 
In addition to the majority opinion, there was a concurring opinion and a dissenting 
opinion. The concurring opinion stated that the court should have ruled that the cross-border 
fracturing was not a trespass.222 The concurring justice asserted that public policy strongly favors 
the use of hydraulic fracturing for purposes of maximizing the production of oil and natural gas 
and that the court should bar fracturing-based trespass claims in order to avoid the chilling effect 
such litigation would have on industry's use of the process.223 The concurring opinion stated that 
landowners or royalty owners who feel aggrieved by cross-border fracturing have a self-help 
remedy (namely, to drill their own wells), that the "orthodox rules" relating to surface trespass 
were not appropriate for "absolutist" application with respect to subsurface intrusions, and that 
2 19 268 S.W.3d at 1 3-4. 
220 Id. 
22 1 Id. at 14. 
222 Id. at 35-6 (Willett, J ., concurring). 
223 Id. at 26-42 (Willett, J ., concurring). 
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the regulation of fracturing should be left to the Texas Railroad Commission, the state agency 
that regulates oil and gas matters. 224 
The dissenting opinion stated that the court should have reached the issue of whether the 
cross-border fracturing constituted a trespass. 225 The dissenting justices did not say how they 
would have decided that issue, but the tone of their opinion suggests that they would have 
decided the subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid was a trespass and that such trespass 
precluded application of the rule of capture.226 
C. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC 
In Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia. LLC. the plaintiffs asserted claims for trespass.227 
They alleged that the defendant had drilled a well that contained a vertical section about 200 feet 
from the plaintiffs' property, but that the well's horizontal lateral approached to within "tens of 
feet" of their property, and that the hydraulic fracturing fluid intruded into the subsurface of their 
property. 22s 
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the trespass claim. 229 They argued that 
the claim was barred by the rule of capture,230 relying in part on the reasoning of Garza,23 1 but 
the Stone court rejected that argument. Garza had supported its conclusion with a traditional 
justification for the rule of capture-the fact that certain self-help remedies still are available for 
224 Id. at 35-6, 38-9 (Willett, J., concurring). 
225 Id. at 47 (Johnson, J., dissenting, joined by two additional justices). 
226 Id. at 42-7 (Johnson, J ., dissenting, joined by two additional justices). 
227 2013  WL 2097397 * 1  (N.D. W.  Va.). The plaintiffs also asserted a claim for a breach of the 
implied covenant to protect against drainage (the defendant was the plaintiffs' lessee) and a 
breach of contract, with the alleged breach being that the defendant had pooled the plaintiffs' 
property with other properties for purposes of production from the Marcellus Shale, but that the 
plaintiffs'  lease did not authorize such pooling. Id. 
228 Id. at *2. 
229 Id. at * 1 .  
230 Id. at *2. 
23 1 Id. at *4. 
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landowners concerned about drainage even when the rule of capture applies. Stone 
acknowledged that the West Virginia Supreme Court had adopted the rule of capture, but Stone 
still rejected the availability of self-help as a reason to reject a claim for subsurface trespass. 
Stone explained that self-help remedies are inadequate because some landowners lack the 
resources to utilize them. 232 
Stone similarly rejected the other reasons that Garza gave in support of its conclusion that 
"the rule of capture should not be changed." Stone also relied on the reasoning in Young v. Ethyl 
� in which the United States Eighth Circuit concluded that the rule of capture should not 
apply in the context of a brine production process that works much like waterflooding, with 
water being injected into the subsurface using multiple injection wells in order to push the flow 
of brine toward a production well.233 
After concluding that the rule of capture should not apply, and therefore was not a viable 
defense to the plaintiffs' trespass claim, Stone turned to the issue of whether there had been a 
trespass. Stone concluded that there had been a trespass, relying on the fact that the West 
Virginia Supreme Court previously had stated the ad coelum doctrine governed a landowner's 
ownership rights.234 Accordingly, Stone rejected the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 235 
The result in Stone, like that in Garza, is defensible, but the reasoning in Stone, like that 
in Garza, is less than satisfactory with respect to the question of whether the defendants' actions 
232 Id. at *6. 
233 Id.at *6 (quoting Young v. Ethyl Corp. , 521 F.2d 77 1 (8th Cir. 1975)). 
234 Id. at *7-8. 
235 Id. at *9. 
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constituted a trespass.236 Stone discussed the issue, but its analysis was hardly more thorough 
than that in Garza, which disclaimed any need to decide whether there had been a trespass. Stone 
began its discussion of the trespass question by expressly noting Garza's quote from Causby that 
the ad coelum doctrine "has no place in the modern world,"237 a quote by which Garza and 
Causby expressed their conclusion that the doctrine does not apply literally. Stone then 
contrasted that quote with a quote in which the West Virginia Supreme Court "reaffirmed the 
maxim" in 2003.238 But it strains plausibility for Stone to suggest that the ad coelum doctrine 
applies literally under West Virginia law. 
Neither the West Virginia Supreme Court nor any other court has ever applied the 
doctrine to its full literal extent, and the commentators and courts that have examined the issue 
have uniformly concluded that the doctrine is mere dicta that does not apply literally.239 Further, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court case that Stone quotes was not dealing with hydraulic 
fracturing or a claim for trespass, or with any other issue that sheds much light on whether 
subsurface intrusions by fracturing fluid constitute a trespass. Instead, the quoted case merely 
addressed whether the language of a particular oil and gas lease granted the right to produce 
coal bed methane. 240 
236 The imperfections in the reasoning of Stone are ironic given that Stone projects not merely a 
rejection of the reasoning in Garza, but complete disdain for it. See, e. g. id. at *6 ("The Garza 
opinion gives oil and gas operators a blank check to steal from the small landowner."); id. 
("[T]his Court simply cannot believe that our West Virginia Supreme Court would permit such a 
result."). 
237 Id. at *7. 
238 Id. at *7 (quoting Drummond v. White Oak Fuel, 104 W.Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 ( 1927); Energy 
Development Corp. v. Moss, 591 S .E.2d 135, 143 n. 14 (2003)). 
239 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 8 17, 825 (Ga. 1934); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 
4 1 F.2d 929, 936-8 (N.D. Ohio 1930); John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 979, 999- 1003 (2008). 
240 Drummond v. White Oak Fuel, 104 W.Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 ( 1927); Energy Development 
Corp. v. Moss, 591 S .E.2d 1 35, 143 (2003). 
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V. PROPOSED "TRADITIONAL" TRESPASS MODEL 
To properly resolve whether the intrusion of fracturing fluid constitutes an actionable 
subsurface trespass, a court must examine the nature of a plaintiffs interest in the subsurface. 
Neither Garza nor Stone gave proper attention to this issue. 
In Garza, the court failed to give this issue appropriate attention because the court 
concluded that it could resolve the plaintiffs' claims by a rule of capture analysis alone. The 
court should have more thoroughly considered whether the defendant's fracturing across 
property lines constituted a trespass that precluded application of the rule of capture. In Stone, 
the court oversimplified the dispute it faced by casually dismissing the possibility that the ad 
coelum doctrine might not apply at the depths at which the defendants were operating, and that 
the defendants ' actions therefore might not constitute a trespass. Thus, neither court properly 
analyzed whether a trespass had occurred. 
So what is the proper model or test for analyzing whether a trespass has occurred? If the 
ad coelum doctrine were given literal application, any subsurface or airspace intrusion could be 
the basis for a trespass claim. But no one can plausibly deny that the full, literal statement of the 
ad coelum doctrine is mere dicta and that it always has been mere dicta. Further, there is a clear 
trend of courts limiting the ability of plaintiffs to recover in trespass for intrusions at high 
elevation and great depths. Therefore, a model which provides that any subsurface or airspace 
intrusion constitutes a trespass is not a true expression of the traditional trespass model. Instead, 
such a model is no more than a purported traditional model. 
A true traditional model must be gleaned from the actual holdings of cases, not dicta. 
Based on the traditional concept that trespass is a claim to vindicate a plaintiffs right to 
exclusive possession of property, and the case law dealing with subsurface and airspace trespass, 
5 1  
the most accurate description of trespass law for airspace and subsurface intrusions is that a 
landowner does not have a claim for airspace or subsurface trespass unless an intrusion occurs: 
( 1 ) relatively near the surface or (2) at an elevation or depth where a landowner could reasonably 
be expected to exercise exclusive use of the area in some manner that would not involve the 
landowner himself likely causing intrusions into another person's airspace or subsurface. In 
some circumstances, if important public policy concerns provide reasons to limit trespass clams, 
it will be appropriate to add the additional restriction that a plaintiff cannot recover unless the 
defendant's  conduct unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land, as 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts has done for airspace trespasses. 
Support for the accuracy of this description of the true traditional model of airspace and 
subsurface trespass law comes from the fact that the expression of this model (the "Model") is 
consistent with the results in most case law involving claims of airspace and subsurface 
intrusions. For example, the Model would allow liability for low-level intrusions across a 
plaintiffs  land by building protrusions, as well as intrusions by low altitude flights that interfere 
with his use and enjoyment of his land. But the Model would not impose trespass liability for 
high altitude flights because a landowner could not reasonably be expected to use such elevations 
in connection with his use and enjoyment of his land. His only practical use of such elevations 
would be for his own air travel, which would not be related to his use and enjoyment of his land, 
and which (as a practical matter) likely would involve him flying over the airspace of other 
person's property. Such results are consistent with most existing airspace trespass jurisprudence. 
This Model is also consistent with the rule that there is no liability for injection disposal 
operations that result in waste fluids crossing property lines. Such injections typically are made 
into deep formations that do not contain water that is drinking water quality or commercial 
52 
quantities of hydrocarbons. In most cases, a landowner's only use of such a formation below his 
land would be if he wished to conduct his own injection disposal. But if he does that, the waste 
fluids that he would discard in the formation eventually would migrate beyond his property if he 
operated the injection well for any considerable period of time. Thus, the Model provides for the 
same result as the existing jurisprudence. 
VI. APPL YING THE PROPOSED "TRADITIONAL" MODEL TO HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING INTRUSIONS 
A. Application to "Near Border" Intrusions 
This article's "Traditional Model" would preclude trespass liability for subsurface 
intrusions of hydraulic fracturing fluids, provided that the operator did not design the fracture to 
go beyond the border, and the operator did not negligently cause the fractures to extend beyond 
the border for a significantly greater distance than the fractures otherwise would have in the 
absence of negligence. The reasoning for this result is as follows. 
Assume that there is a subsurface formation from which oil or gas can be produced using 
hydraulic fracturing, but that there is no other practical use of the formation. The length of 
hydraulic fractures cannot be controlled with precision, though fracture length can be estimated. 
For purposes of discussion, suppose that the existing state of technology is such that, when 
companies conduct hydraulic fracturing in the formation, they typically can control fracture 
lengths within a distance of plus or minus 500 feet (for convenience, this article will sometimes 
refer to the typical maximum distance between predicated fracture lengths and actual fracture 
lengths as the "Length of Typical Fracture Uncertainty"). 241 If an operator ("Operator") wanted 
24 1 Of course this is a simplification. Logically, the "plus or minus" distance within which 
fracture length can be controlled should depend on the degree of certainty or confidence that the 
"error" will not be exceeded. Thus, the "plus or minus" deviation would be greater if a company 
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to ensure that it did not unintentionally cause fracturing fluid to enter the subsurface of land 
belonging to the neighbor (the "Neighbor"), the Operator would have to design its projected 
fracture length to stop 500 feet short of the property line. Assume now that the Neighbor also 
wants to engage in hydraulic fracturing.242 If the Neighbor wanted to ensure that he did not 
cause a subsurface intrusion of fracturing fluid, then he would have to design his own fractures 
to stop 500 feet from the property line. 
Thus, neither Operator nor Neighbor can intentionally use the area within 500 feet of the 
property line, unless they accept the possibility that they might unintentionally cause fractures to 
cross the property line. But if they design their fractures to extend all the way to the property 
line, accepting the possibility of unintentional subsurface intrusions, they are each accepting the 
possibility that they will not have exclusive actual use of the 500 feet of their subsurface that is 
nearest the property line. 
Under the Model, a person would not have a claim for subsurface trespass unless there 
were an intrusion into an area where he could exercise exclusive use without risking that he will 
intrude into another person's subsurface. As applied to Operator and Neighbor, neither of them 
should have a trespass claim for subsurface intrusions of fracturing fluid that extend less than 
500 feet onto their side of the property line (the "Near Border" area), because neither of them can 
expect to exercise exclusive use of that area without risking the possibility that they will cause 
subsurface intrusions onto the other's property. 
wanted to be 95-percent certain it would not exceed a particular length than if it was satisfied 
with being 90-percent certain that it would not exceed a particular length. Further, even for a 
given percentage confidence level, it might be difficult to define the "plus or minus" distance, 
and it likely would be different in different formations. 
242 If, on the other hand, we assume that Neighbor would never fracture, then the Neighbor 
would never produce oil or gas from the Formation and thus would not be harmed by drainage 
because he never would have produced oil or gas from the Formation anyway. 
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Notably, this means that Operator and Neighbor can each design their own fractures to 
extend to the property line and still be confident that they will not incur trespass liability, 
because they typically can control their fracture lengths to within plus or minus 500 feet, which 
is the depth of the Near Border area within which they will not incur liability for subsurface 
intrusions. But if they designed their fractures to extend across into the other's subsurface, they 
would risk trespass liability. Both the ability to design their fractures to extend to the border and 
the fact that they will risk liability if they design their fractures to go further have an aspect of 
fairness. 
Contrast this with a system that would impose trespass liability even for slight Near 
Border intrusions. The message such a l iability scheme would send is that Operator and 
Neighbor should each seek to avoid even small subsurface intrusions. They could do that, but 
only by designing their fractures to stop 500 feet short of the property line. Thus, any gain that 
either Neighbor or Operator obtained by being less at risk for drainage from the other' s 
fracturing operations would be a purely illusory gain because it would come at a cost of their 
designing their own fractures to be shorter, and thus to drain less area. Further, if they each 
designed their fractures to stop 500 feet from the property line, that would result in waste,243 
because it would mean that between the two of them, Neighbor and Operator would leave a 
1 ,000-foot-wide buffer zone (500 feet on each side of the border) that would be left unfractured 
(unless fractures inadvertently extend beyond the design distance). Thus, there would be waste, 
without any gain in the protection of correlative rights. 
For these reasons, traditional conservation goals of avoiding waste and protecting 
correlative rights are better served by the Model than by a scheme that imposes trespass liability 
243 Avoidance of waste is a traditional goal of virtually all conservation regulations. See, e.g. , La. 
Rev. Stat. 30:5. 
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for any subsurface intrusion. But conservation regulations could take additional steps to protect 
correlative rights. For example, conservation agencies should consider regulations that would 
actually prohibit an operator from designing its fracturing plan to intentionally extend fractures 
beyond a property line, into the subsurface of land where the company has no right to operate. 
Setback rules can be used to prohibit an operator from drilling a horizontal lateral too close to the 
property line. And if credible evidence shows that an operator's fractures have crossed property 
lines into the Near Border subsurface of the neighboring property, conservation agencies that 
have statutory pooling authority should stand ready to use that authority to create a pooled area, 
or revise an existing pooled area, to ensure that the owner of the neighboring property gets some 
share of the oil or gas produced by a well that is draining the Near Border area. 
B. Application to "Interior Property" Intrusions 
The prior section of this article discussed application of the Model to the Near Border 
area. "Near Border" was defined by reference to the "Length of Typical Fracture Uncertainty," 
which was defined as the typical maximum difference between actual fracture lengths and the 
fracture lengths that were predicted prior to the fracturing operation being performed. The Near 
Border area was defined as the area within the Length of Typical Fracture Uncertainty from the 
border. Thus, if the Length of Typical Fracture Uncertainty was 500 feet, the Near Border area 
would be the area within 500 feet of either side of the border. The area further than 500 feet from 
the border could be called the Interior Property area ("Interior Property"). 
Hydraulic fractures that intrude into the Interior Property areas of a neighboring property 
raise different issues than those that intrude only into the Near Border area. First, for example, 
assuming that the operator usually can control the fracture lengths within the Length of Typical 
Fracture Uncertainty, the intrusion of fractures into the Interior Property of the neighbor 
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probably means that the operator probably designed its fractures to go beyond the border. That 
raises fairness issues that are not present when an operator designs his fractures to go no further 
than the border, but the fractures inadvertently intrude into the Near Border region of the 
neighbor's subsurface. 
Second, if the law allows an operator to routinely fracture into the neighbor's Interior 
Property, that gives the neighbor the incentive to "go and do likewise"-that is, to fracture into 
the Interior Property of the land owned or leased by the operator. That creates the potential for 
economic waste in the form of excessive drilling and fracturing, just as the rule of capture creates 
an incentive for excessive drilling when the rule is not tempered by such conservation measures 
as well spacing regulations and statutory pooling. 
Third, the neighbor has a stronger property interest in the subsurface of his Interior 
Property. As noted above, because a person cannot control the length of his hydraulic fractures 
with precision, he cannot design his fractures to into the Near Border subsurface of his own 
property unless he is willing to take the chance that his own fractures will cross the border. Thus, 
a person cannot expect to exercise exclusive use and possession of his own Near Border 
subsurface, whether or not Near Border intrusions are treated as trespasses. If the law treats Near 
Border intrusions as trespasses and imposes liability for such intrusions, a person must leave his 
own Near Border area unfractured in order to avoid the risk that he inadvertently will cause 
subsurface intrusions into his neighbor's Near Border subsurface because of his inability to 
precisely control the length of the fractures he creates. On the other hand, if the law does not 
impose liability for Near Border intrusions, a person can fracture his Near Border subsurface, but 
he cannot count on having exclusive use and possession of that area because his neighbor will be 
free to fracture into that area without liability. 
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In contrast, a person can fracture his Interior Property subsurface without risk of causing 
fractures to intrude beyond the border, and the same can be said for his neighbor. Thus, a person 
can exercise exclusive use (by fracturing) of the subsurface of the Interior Property regions of his 
land. Accordingly, a person has a much stronger property interest in the Interior Property 
subsurface than in the Near Border subsurface, and a much stronger interest in whether he can 
bring a trespass claim if someone causes intrusions into that area. 
Moreover, given that a person can exercise exclusive use of the Interior Property 
subsurface without risk that he will intrude into another person's  subsurface, the Model for 
evaluating trespass claims suggests that, under a traditional trespass model, a landowner should 
be allowed to bring a trespass claim if someone intrudes into that area (unless public policy 
concerns dictate that a person cannot prevail in trespass unless he also shows actual harm or an 
actual interference with his use and enjoyment of his property). Such a legal regime would honor 
traditional conceptions of property rights and trespass, and also would provide some protection 
for correlative rights. 
VII. MODERN MODELS 
Arguments can be made for various other potential models for determining trespass 
liability that would diverge even further from a model based on the literal language of the ad 
coelum doctrine than does the True Traditional Model described above. For example, the 
discussion above simplifies the analysis by assuming that there is a specific "plus or minus" 
distance within which companies can control the length of fractures. Because the potential for 
fracture length to vary from the designed fracture length is more complex than saying that 
operators can control the length within a single "plus or minus" distance, and because the use of 
hydraulic fracturing serves public policy, one could argue for some other trespass rule that gives 
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fracturing operations greater protection against trespass claims. 
Indeed, Professor Owen Anderson has made a forceful argument that there generally 
should not be liability for fracturing intrusions. 244 Based on many of the same l ines of cases 
discussed above, as well as public policy arguments, he argues that the current state of the law 
should be recognized as prohibiting subsurface trespass claims unless the plaintiff demonstrates 
that the subsurface intrusion reached subsurface areas relatively near the surface and the 
intrusion interfered with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his land. Professor Anderson argues 
that such a rule would be a mirror image of the Restatement's rule for trespass claims based on 
aircraft flights over property and that such a rule would serve public policy. His proposal 
generally would bar subsurface trespass claims based on fractures even if they intrude far beyond 
a border. 
A potential benefit of Professor Anderson's proposal is that it would eliminate litigation 
over what is the dimension of the Near Borer area. But in order to avoid waste and infringements 
on correlative rights of the type noted in Section Vl(B) of this article, a conservation agency 
would have to take an active role in managing forced pooling, spacing, and fracturing plans if 
such a model were used. 
Professor David Pierce has argued that the fact that fractures cross property lines should 
not necessarily be a basis for trespass liability, and that an operator's potential liability should be 
244 Owen L. Anderson, Lord Coke, the Restatement, and Modem Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 
Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 203 (2010-201 1 ). Professor Anderson argues that the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts should be revised to give subsurface intrusions a status similar to airspace 
intrusions by aircraft, so that there is no liability for subsurface trespass unless the intrusion is 
near the surface of the land and "it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of 
is land." Id. at 2 1 1 .  
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evaluated based on a correlative rights analysis.245 Such a regime would allow for significant 
flexibility in promoting production, while simultaneously preventing waste and protecting 
correlative rights, but the effective administration of such a regime also would require 
conservation agencies to be very active in order to promote their twin mission of preventing 
waste and protecting correlative rights. 
CONCLUSION 
There is growing interest in the question of whether a person who is conducting hydraulic 
fracturing commits an actionable subsurface trespass when he causes fractures to cross into the 
subsurface of a neighbor's land and those fractures facilitate drainage of hydrocarbons, but 
otherwise causes no harm to the neighbor. Two courts have addressed this question in recent 
years, but they reached opposite conclusions and neither provided satisfactory analysis of the 
trespass question. 
The traditional expression of the ad coelum doctrine would suggest that a landowner's 
ownership includes the entire subsurface of his property, all the way to the center of the earth, as 
well as to all the airspace above his property, all the way into space. But the traditional 
expression of that doctrine is mere dicta. Case law recognizes the validity of trespass claims for 
airspace and subsurface intrusions that occur relatively near the surface, but a clear majority of 
245David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by 
Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. Rev. 759, 77 1 -72 (2009). Professor Pierce 
writes that, "It is not a simple trespass issue because each owner overlying the reservoir in fact 
has rights in the reservoir beneath every other owners' land." Id. at 771 .  He states: 
[A]ddressing the issue in a correlative rights context requires that the conduct 
itself be evaluated to determine whether it is appropriate behavior within the 
reservoir community. Under a correlative rights analysis, if the hydraulic 
fracturing is held to be "appropriate behavior within the reservoir community," 
the resulting drainage will be protected by the rule of capture. On the other hand, 
if the hydraulic fracturing is held to violate correlative rights of others within the 
reservoir community, drainage will not be protected by the rule of capture. 
Id. at 77 1 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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courts that have faced disputes over high elevation intrusions or deep subsurface intrusions have 
held that a plaintiff cannot recover in trespass for such intrusions absent interference with his use 
and enjoyment of his property. This majority result, rather than a literal expression of the ad 
coelum doctrine, is the true expression of the law regarding airspace and subsurface trespass 
claims. 
This paper has proposed a test for determining whether a subsurface intrusion by 
hydraulic fracturing constitutes a trespass. This "Model" approach combines the established law 
regarding airspace and subsurface trespass with the traditional concept that claims for trespass 
are designed to vindicate a plaintiff's interest in the exclusive possession of property. When this 
Model is applied to trespass claims that are based on intrusions by hydraulic fractures, it is 
evident that there should not be liability for such intrusions if they do not extend beyond the 
property border for a distance greater than the typical "plus or minus" distance within which 
fracture length can be controlled. 
This is because a landowner and his neighbor cannot use such "Near Border" areas of 
their respective properties for purposes of hydraulic fracturing (the only practical use that can be 
made of some formations) without risking that they will cause subsurface intrusions into the 
other's property. Thus, they cannot have both the actual use and the exclusive possession of the 
Near Border subsurface of their respective land-they can have only one or another. Under such 
circumstances, application of the Model demonstrates that neither of themshould have trespass 
claims for Near Border subsurface intrusions by the other. 
In contrast, when fractures intrude beyond the Near Border area, a trespass claim should 
be allowed. A landowner has a greater interest in protecting the interior areas of his property 
from subsurface intrusions than the Near Border areas. Further, if there were no liability in 
61  
trespass for subsurface intrusions beyond the Near Border area, that might prompt neighbors to 
hydraulically fracture as far as possible into the each other's property, thereby resulting in 
economic waste in the form of excess fracturing. 
Finally, it should be noted that certain public policy arguments favor a "modern" model 
that would place greater restrictions on subsurface trespass claims. but conservation agencies 
would need to vigilantly apply conservation regulations in order to prevent waste and protect 
correlative rights if significantly greater limitations were placed on subsurface trespass claims. 
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